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Abstract
We study the impact of sterilized Central Bank interventions on the microstructure of currency
markets. We analyze their major channels of eﬀectiveness, imperfect substitutability and sig-
naling, in a model of sequential trading in which the stylized monetary authority is a rational,
but not necessarily profit-maximizing player. In such a setting, and consistent with available
empirical evidence, we find that intervention has endogenous long-lived eﬀects on quotes when
informative about policy objectives and fundamentals, or when the threat of future actions by
the Central Bank is significant and credible, for these circumstances lead uninformed investors
or dealers to a permanent revision in their beliefs. Portfolio balance eﬀects of such transactions
are instead short-lived, because of trading occurring sequentially and not because of high asset
substitutability, as often argued in the literature. We also find that a monetary authority at-
tempting to lean against the wind or to chase the trend of the domestic currency is generally
more successful when dealers compete against each other for the incoming trades. Intuitively,
competition induces the dealers to pass all revenues or losses they expect from trading with the
Central Bank onto the population of investors. This is accomplished by greater, and generally
asymmetric, revisions of their bid and ask quotes. The resulting equilibrium process of intraday
price formation and bid-ask spreads are shown to depend crucially on the degree of market power
held by the forex dealers, on the sign and magnitude of announced and realized interventions, on
the perceived likelihood of a future intervention to occur, and on the transparency of the order
flow induced by the intervention.
1 Introduction and motivation
The foreign exchange market is probably the most active financial market in the world in terms of
volume, frequency, and intensity of trading.1 Nonetheless, constraints to the availability of data
on intraday quotes, spreads, and transactions prevented investigations of the microstructure of
currency markets from occurring with the same degree of detail as in the case of centralized equity
markets like the NYSE. These constraints arise from the fact that currencies are traded over-the
counter (OTC), hence banks and other dealers have no obligation to report their activity to the
public. However, progress in computer and communications technology over the past few years
has made live trading data available at shorter time intervals. A renewed interest in analyzing
the microstructure of the foreign exchange (forex) market has ensued. In most of these cases
however, with the notable exceptions of Lyons (1997), Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), and
Evans and Lyons (2001), researchers’ eﬀorts have been typically oriented toward applying and
testing existing microstructure theories. Indeed, the empirical analysis of these rich datasets
has not been preceded by theoretical studies of how institutional features specific to currency
markets may aﬀect their functioning and the resulting process of price formation. The main
objective of this paper is to attempt to fill this gap. We focus on some important aspects of the
global currency markets that are not shared by any equity market, in particular the likelihood
of intervention by a rational, but not necessarily profit-maximizing player like the Central Bank
(CB), and derive from their inclusion several empirically testable implications for quotes and
bid-ask spreads.
Many macroeconomics textbooks describe the exchange rate as an intermediate target of
monetary policy. This simply means that CBs choose specific levels (or bands of fluctuation)
for the domestic currency that are compatible with the “ultimate” trade-oﬀ of monetary policy,
between a sustainable growth of the economy (the “output gap”) and moderate levels of infla-
tion. Each monetary authority weighs growth and price stability diﬀerently, but all of them are
expected to participate in the currency markets to serve their agenda of political economy. CBs
may also promote less stringent economic agendas, under pressures from political power, interest
lobbies, etc. Nonetheless, in both cases the resulting actions by the CB may not be motivated
by pure profit. Indeed, there is much anecdotal and empirical evidence that policy objectives
and maximization of long-term wealth or short-term profit often collide. For example, Taylor
(1982) uses the profit criterion of Friedman (1953) to show that, during the 1970s, CBs obtained
only mixed results when actively resisting currency fluctuations, but lost billions of dollars in the
process.
In the market microstructure literature on asymmetric information, insiders always experience
profits at the expense of market-makers and uninformed (noise) traders.2 Forex dealers may
instead reasonably expect not only to suﬀer potential losses but also to earn potential gains from
trading against the government, even if the domestic monetary authorities are better informed
about economic fundamentals and policy objectives. This again might occur when CB actions
are rational, but not consistent with trading profit or wealth maximization. The market power
held by dealers in the currency market would then determine how much of these potential gains
1The BIS (1999) triennial survey of currency market activity for 1998 reports that about $1.5 trillion in
transactions are executed in the global foreign exchange market every trading day.
2O’Hara (1995) reviews the market microstructure literature dealing with issues associated with information
economics.
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or losses will be passed to investors via quotes’ revisions and spreads’ adjustments. CBs may also
take positions in the currency markets following purely speculative motives, as in the frequently
cited example of Bank Negara, the Malaysian monetary authority, in the early 1990s.3 In such
circumstances, currency dealers may incur losses against those potentially better-informed agents.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper explores the short- and long-term impact of
oﬃcial spot interventions on diﬀerent dimensions of the intraday process of price formation in
the forex market: quotes, quotes’ revisions, absolute and proportional bid-ask spreads, price
volatility, and investors’ order flow.4 To that end, we develop a model of sequential exchange
rate trading in the spirit of Garman (1976), Brock and Kleidon (1992), and Saar (2000a, b).
There are two assets in the economy, a domestic and a foreign currency-denominated riskless
bond. Investors reach the market one at a time, according to an exogenously selected arrival
process, and trade just once. The investors’ population is made of two diﬀerent types of price-
taking agents, depending on their initial endowment of the domestic asset (high or low). These
agents formulate orders that maximize constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) expected utility
of their final wealth. Liquidity is provided, and prices are set by a monopolist or by competitive
risk-neutral market-makers who maximize expected instantaneous profits from trading under a
market-clearing constraint and while facing uncertainty about the identity of the next incoming
order.
We then extend this basic setup by including a stylized monetary authority whose actions
are fully consistent with the available literature on oﬃcial intervention. At the core of our work
is in fact Madhavan’s (2000) recognition of “the potential value from combining microstructure
and macro variables within a single model” to enhance the understanding of the global currency
markets. We concentrate on the most common form of intervention, i.e., on CB transactions
that, by leaving the domestic monetary base unchanged, do not aﬀect monetary policy and
economic fundamentals. The eﬀectiveness of sterilized interventions, as those actions are known
in the literature, is still controversial and, as such, at the center of the current theoretical and
empirical debate. The resulting model, albeit parsimonious, allows us to consider the two major
channels of eﬀectiveness of sterilized intervention, imperfect substitutability (or portfolio balance)
and signaling, without sacrificing its analytical tractability.5
Our framework integrates a rational, but not necessarily profit-maximizing CB in a purely
microstructure setting in which orders do not clear simultaneously, dealers hold diﬀerent degrees
3Bank Negara is commonly believed to be responsible for a series of speculative attacks against many currencies
from 1990 to 1992. However, according to Brown (2000), Bank Negara was “using its inside information as a
member of the club of central bankers to speculate in currencies, sometimes to an amount in excess of $1 Billion
a day,” since late 1989. At that time, Dr. Mahathir, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, was reported claiming that the
CB’s practices were no more than “active reserve management.”
4Lyons (2001) defines the spot market “the essence of the forex market.” However, CBs can (and sometimes do)
use alternative financial instruments for their interventions, like interest rates, forward contracts, or derivatives.
There is some agreement (e.g., Eaton and Turnovsky (1984), Miller (1998), Sarno and Taylor (2001)) that spot
trades are nontheless the most eﬀective transactions in signaling CB’s intentions and objectives to the market at
large, as they have a direct cost for the CB.
5In the first case (e.g., Branson (1983, 1984)), CB trades alter the composition of the agents’ portfolios. The
exchange rate must then shift to change the expected returns from holding less than perfectly substitutable
domestic and foreign bonds, and so induce the market to adjust to the new currency supply. In the second case
(Mussa (1981), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997)), intervention aﬀects exchange rates by providing investors and
forex dealers with supposedly new and relevant information.
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of market power, and there is full information or diﬀerent degrees of asymmetric information
among the players. Our analysis of the role of a monetary authority, and of its eﬀectiveness
in managing the exchange rate in such a setting is, to our knowledge, an original contribution
to the economic and financial literature. Our model generates both macro and microstructure
implications. We show that endogenously formulated sterilized CB intervention, or merely its
likelihood, has long-lived eﬀects on the exchange rate when the actions of the monetary au-
thority are informative about policy objectives or economic fundamentals, or when the threat
of future intervention is significant and credible, for these circumstances lead uninformed in-
vestors or dealers to a permanent revision in their beliefs. Portfolio balance eﬀects of CB trades
are instead short-lived because of trading occurring sequentially, and not because of high asset
substitutability, as often maintained in the literature.
We also find that such interventions are more successful when dealers compete with each
other for the incoming trade. Intuitively, competition induces the dealers to transfer any addi-
tional revenue or loss they expect from trading with the CB onto the population of investors.
This is accomplished by greater and generally asymmetric revisions of their bid and ask quotes.
The impact of currency management policies on intraday quotes and absolute and proportional
spreads is not unidirectional, and depends crucially not only on the degree of market power held
by the forex dealers, as suggested above, but also on the sign and magnitude of the announced
and realized intervention, on the perceived likelihood of a future intervention to occur, and on
the transparency of the order flow induced by the intervention.
Closely related to our study are two recent papers, Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) and
Evans and Lyons (2001). Naranjo and Nimalendran explain the estimated increase in daily bid-
ask spreads in proximity of unexpected interventions in the Deutschemark/U.S. Dollar market
with adverse selection considerations. Their argument however depends crucially on the restric-
tive assumptions that CBs, acting as large insiders, attempt to disguise their presence among
uninformed investors and that their trades are exogenously eﬀective. Evans and Lyons (2001)
instead concentrate exclusively on the portfolio balance impact of order flow uncertainty in-
duced by exogenous interventions on inter-dealer trading by extending the “hot potato” model
of Lyons (1997). Information asymmetry and signaling eﬀects, although of greater empirical
significance (e.g., Edison (1993), Pasquariello (2002)), are therefore ruled out by construction.
Furthermore, their model is in the spirit of simultaneous-move games, and does not study the
intraday dynamics of bid-oﬀer spreads.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3 we derive
our first set of results for quotes and spreads assuming full information and for diﬀerent degrees
of market power held by the dealers. Section 4 extends the setting of the previous two sections
to a unifying example of information asymmetry between the CB and the population of investors
and dealers. Section 5 explores the eﬀects of such additional uncertainty on the equilibrium
process of price formation using sequential stages of a stylized trading day in the forex market.
In Section 6 we conclude by summarizing our results and outlining potential extensions of our
work.
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2 The basic model
Foreign exchange (forex) markets share with most financial markets the attribute that investors
do not necessarily hit dealers’s quotes with orders at the same time. Uncertainty regarding the
nature and the timing of the incoming order aﬀects the way dealers formulate prices at which
they are willing to sell and to buy the traded asset, in this case the currency. Hence, they use
the arrival of orders, and their characteristics (like their size and sign) to extract information not
only regarding the exchange rate but also regarding the composition of the investors’ population
at large or the nature of investors’ demand function.
The financial literature has developed several models for the sequential arrival of investors to
a market.6 The basic setup of our model is similar in spirit to Bhattacharya and Weller (1997)
and Saar (2000a, b). In the following subsections we describe such framework, define how the
three categories of players we consider in this paper, investors, dealers (MM), and Central Banks
(CB), interact in the economy, and present a base scenario for equilibrium quotes and spreads
under two extreme degrees of market power (monopoly and perfect competition) and no CB
intervention. Finally, we allow the CB to be part of the general population of investors, and
derive our first set of results in the context of full information. We will introduce information
asymmetry in Section 4.
2.1 Assets
There are two assets in the economy, a riskless bond paying R > 1 units of the domestic currency
(e.g., U.S. dollars, USD) and a riskless bond paying RF > 1 units of the foreign currency (e.g.,
British pounds, GBP) at time T 0. We assume, for sake of simplicity, that investors, dealers, and
CBs are dollar-based agents, i.e., that the domestic currency is the numeraire. Hence, the dollar
payoﬀ at time T 0 of the GBP-denominated bond, F , is uncertain (and consequently risky) because
the amount of USD necessary to buy one GBP at time T 0, ST 0, is uncertain, i.e., F = RFST 0 . In
this economy, trading exchange rates is then equivalent to trading USD versus GBP-denominated
T-bills. To ease the notation, we let RF be equal to 1, so to interpret F simply as the uncertain
future value of the exchange rate between USD and GBP. We assume that nature draws F at
time T 0 from a Normal distribution with (random and chosen at time zero) mean f and variance
σ2F . Only in a full information scenario all players (investors, dealers, and monetary authority)
are aware of nature’s initial selection for f . The exchange rate market opens at time zero, and
trading occurs until time T < T 0. The interval [0, T ] can be interpreted as a short period of time,
for example one trading day. The distance between T and T 0 is controlled by R; for a given set
of annual riskless rates, higher R (and RF ) implies that the long-term realization ST 0 is further
in the future. Intraday interest rates are assumed to be zero.
Arrivals of orders, like in traditional sequential trading models, are here exogenous and driven
by an orderly point process G (t) (as in Saar (2000a, b)), so that only one arrival is allowed at
any discrete point in time t. We assume that for each t ∈ [0, T ] there is a probability l ∈ [0, 1]
of a CB’s order, and a probability (1− l) of an investor’s order arriving to the market. The
6Models of non-simultaneous trading have been used to study the problem of a dealer facing incoming orders
that move him away from his desired inventory position (as in Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll
(1981)), or of a market-maker facing incoming orders from potentially better-informed traders (e.g., Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) or Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1991, and 1992)).
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parameter l can alternatively be interpreted as the frequency (or credibility) of CB’s arrivals
during a trading day, and it is assumed to be exogenously chosen by the Central Banker, i.e., by
the Governor, policymakers, politicians, etc.
2.2 Investors
Investors are risk-averse, and may belong to two diﬀerent types, 1 and 2, depending on their
initial endowment of risky GBP-denominated T-bills and riskless USD-denominated T-bills, X1
and X2, and B1 and B2, respectively. There is a fraction q of investors of type 1 in the general
population of investors; hence q (always known to all agents) can be interpreted as the probability
that, if an investor’s order arrived to the market, that order comes from a type 1 investor. We
assume that X1 > X2, i.e., that type 1 investors are potentially net sellers, and type 2 investors
are potentially net buyers of GBP. While this assumption is not relevant to any of the results
we obtain in the paper, it nonetheless facilitates the interpretation of investors’ actions and
the analysis of the demand elasticity of the investors’ population. All investors maximize the
expected CARA utility of their final wealth, WT 0 , with the same degree of risk-aversion α. All
investors take market prices as given, and do not return to the market after they traded to
rebalance their endowment portfolio.7 In such setting, the optimal demand schedule for GBP
and USD-denominated T-bills, Qi,t and Bi,t, respectively, of an investor belonging to type i
∈ (1, 2), with information set Ii,t, are the solution of the following problem:
max
Qi,t,Bi,t
E
£−e−αWi,T 0 |Ii,t¤
s.t. Bi,t + StQi,t = Bi + StX i
RBi,t + FQi,t =Wi,T 0 ,
(1)
where the USD (GBP) price of the USD (GBP)-denominated riskless bond is set to unity. The
solution of this problem is well-known in the financial literature, and the optimal demand for an
investor of type i is given by8
Qi,t =
E [f |It]−RSt
ασ2F
. (2)
Under full information E [f |It] is equal to f , and we can write the expression for the net
demand for GBP-denominated T-bills of type i investors as
Xi,t =
1
π
µ
f
R
− St
¶
−X i, (3)
where π = ασ
2
F
R
is a parameter controlling the elasticity of investors’ demand for risky assets, i.e.,
the less than perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign currency-denominated T-bills. A
positive (negative) Xi,t is interpreted as a buy (sell) order for the foreign currency.
7This assumption is reasonable if we interpret the interval [0, T ] as one trading day.
8See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) use a similar description of investors’
activity in the currency markets, and label those agents foreign exchange speculators.
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2.3 Dealers
As observed by Lyons (1995), most currency dealers tend to close their working day with a zero
net position in their inventory. Why does this occur? Lyons suggests that, because trading in
currencies might continue during the evening, the prospect of carrying an open position through
the night without being able to properly monitor it is not particularly appealing to both the
dealers and the banks for which they operate. There is also some anecdotal evidence of the fact
that most forex dealers, because of the pace of the trading day, do not formulate any opinion
about where the true value of the currency should be, hence they do not trade as investors.
It then seems reasonable to imagine that forex dealers, in setting their quotes, would try
to impose no expected (positive or negative) drift to their inventory at any point in time, but
simply to profit from incoming orders by charging a bid-ask spread as compensation for providing
liquidity services to investors (and CBs). It is equally reasonable to suspect that diﬀerent degrees
of market power held by currency dealers have an eﬀect on the process of intraday price formation,
and on their ability to extract rents from the exogenously driven order flow. For some exchange
rates, e.g., Yen versus USD (JPYUSD) or Euro versus USD (EURUSD), competition among
dealers is intense and may exert a downward pressure on their compensation for the liquidity
they provide to the market. However, for some other exchange rates, especially in emerging
economies, there are often very few dealers providing that service on a regular basis and for
significant trade sizes.
Consistently with this view of the activity of market-makers (MMs) in the forex markets, we
consider the extreme cases of a monopolist dealer, and of a set of competitive dealers. In the
monopolist case, at each t the dealer sets quotes that maximize the expected profit per unit time,
i.e., that maximize the expected cash inflows from selling shares minus the expected cash outflows
from buying shares to and from investors (and maybe the CB).9 Many competing dealers instead
set the same quotes such that the expected profit for the representative MM is equal to zero, by
virtue of Bertrand competition.10 In order to isolate the impact of interventions on quotes and
spreads, we assume that the MMs do not face any order processing costs or inventory control,
i.e., that our stylized currency market is frictionless. Then, if we defineMt as the information set
available to the dealer(s) at time t, before the next incoming order arrives, Si,t as the price quoted
to an investor of type i, and SCBt as the price quoted to the CB, the expected instantaneous
profit Πt earned by the MM can be represented as
E [Πt|Mt] = (1− l) qX1,tS1,t + (1− l) (1− q)X2,tS2,t + lXCBt SCBt , (4)
where XCBt is the CB order. In the full information scenario, Mt includes all parameters con-
trolling the terminal payoﬀ of the risky GBP bond, all characteristics of the investor (and CB)
population, including their demand functions, and all past transactions.
In both cases, dealers are subject to the constraint that their inventory has no expected drift
at each point in time. Hence, before an order actually arrives, quotes are set so that the market
is always cleared by balancing the expected flow of currency bought and sold at every instant t.
9Amihud and Mendelson (1980) use a similar specification, but allow the MM to set prices so that his expected
inventory position may lay inside some pre-specified bounds.
10This is also the case in many other sequential trading models (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Madhavan
(1992), just to name a few) under the assumptions of risk-neutrality and no capital constraint for the MM. For
more on this topic see Saar (2000a).
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The no-expected inventory condition at each point in time is
E [Zt|Mt] = (1− l) qX1,t + (1− l) (1− q)X2,t + lXCBt = 0, (5)
where (−Zt) is the instantaneous inventory position of the dealer(s). This assumption captures
the nature of MMs’ activity in the currency markets. It in fact translates our earlier observation
that forex dealers basically attempt to balance the expected flow of currency bought and sold
at each moment without imposing any expected drift to their inventory, instead of behaving
similarly to investors holding GBP-denominated bonds until maturity.
At each instant t dealers in this economy set potential (or reservation) prices, i.e., quotes at
which they are willing to buy, if a type 2 investor arrives, to sell, if a type 1 investor arrives,
and to trade with a CB, if the monetary authority intervenes. When an investor’s order hits the
dealers’ screens, the only equilibrium price is going to be the one, and the one only, resulting from
the most recent transaction. We define the expected transaction price as S∗t = qS1,t+(1− q)S2,t.
Nonetheless, it is that declaration of intents by the dealer(s) that constitutes the bid and oﬀer
quotes. Trading is not anonymous with respect to whether the incoming order is from the
population of investors or from the CB, as it appears to be the case in most forex markets.
However, MMs can distinguish the type of an arriving investor just from the sign and size of the
submitted order.
We start with the assumption that l is zero, i.e., that the “true” likelihood of the CB to
intervene during the interval [0, T ] is zero and known to all market participants (as is f), and
then solve the problem of both the monopolist and the competitive MMs. To this end, we adopt
the convention that each incoming order is split evenly among all dealers quoting the same price,
as in Saar (2000a). We report the resulting equilibrium prices in Proposition 1, as they serve as
a benchmark scenario to evaluate the impact of the introduction of a CB in the next subsection.
Proposition 1 With full information and l = 0, the competitive MMs’ reservation bid and ask
quotes at any point in time t, before an investor’s order arrives, are
Sl=01,t = S
l=0
2,t =
CS∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗, (6)
where X∗ = qX1 + (1− q)X2. The resulting bid-ask spread is equal to zero. The monopolist
MM’s reservation bid and ask quotes are instead given by
Sl=01,t =
f
R
− πX∗ − π (1− q)
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
, (7)
Sl=02,t =
f
R
− πX∗ + πq
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
. (8)
The expected transaction price and the absolute spread are then, respectively,
MS∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗ = CS∗,l=0t = S∗,l=0t (9)
and
Sl=02,t − Sl=01,t =
π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
. (10)
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Proof. See Section 1.2 in Saar (2000a).
In this study we define the bid-ask spread with respect to the investors as the diﬀerence
between the prices dealers quote to type 2 and type 1 traders, i.e., S2,t − S1,t. In the remainder
of the paper, we will specify conditions on the model’s parameters such that type 1 investors
are always net sellers hitting the dealers’ bid quotes S1,t and type 2 investors are always net
buyers hitting the dealers’ ask quotes S2,t. For example, in Proposition 1 we have that X2,t > 0
and X1,t < 0 in both the monopolistic and competitive scenarios if and only if X1 > X2, as we
previously assumed. Under these conditions, we can interpret our spread as a wedge between
the price at which the dealers are willing to sell GBP to type 2 investors and the price at which
the dealers are willing to buy GBP from type 1 investors.
The expected transaction price from the competitive dealers’ setting, CS∗,l=0t in Eq. (6),
corresponds to the price we would observe if all investors arrive at the same time in a competitive
market, i.e., to the market-clearing price. Consequently, the no-expected drift condition of Eq.
(5) in the full information scenario is equivalent to the market-clearing condition in a competitive
equilibrium. The price of the GBP-denominated bond is equal to the discounted future payoﬀ (the
risk-neutral component of Kyle (1985)) minus a risk adjustment factor that is necessary to induce
risk-averse USD-based investors to hold assets in GBP. This component depends positively on
the expected amount of foreign currency already held by the investors X∗ (hence on the relative
types’ weight q) and on the parameter measuring the elasticity of the investor’s demand π. No
spread emerges in this case, because of the assumption of full information in this otherwise
frictionless forex market.
A monopolist dealer uses his market power to extract positive rents from investors by charging
a higher ask to the net buyer type (i = 2), and by paying a lower bid to the net seller type (i = 1).
The ensuing spread depends on the parameters controlling investors’ order flow in π, and is equal
to half of the unconstrained profit-maximizing wedge π
¡
X1 −X2
¢
because the market-clearing
condition is binding. The expected transaction price in Eq. (9), MS∗,l=0t , is nevertheless the same
as in the competitive scenario. As evident from Eqs. (7) to (10), this result does not depend
on whether type 1 investors hold more or less of the GBP bond than type 2 investors, but on
whether there is trading in this economy, i.e., X1 6= X2.11
2.4 Central Bank
Most Central Banks frequently intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to manage
otherwise free-floating rates, to comply with existing international currency agreements, to serve
broad macroeconomic and monetary agendas, or as a result of domestic political pressure. In
less frequent occasions, interventions are conducted with the purpose of remedying balance of
payments problems, although such actions are explicitly prohibited by the IMF Article 4, Section
1. In some circumstances CBs have also acted in pursuit of purely speculative motives, as in
the case of Bank Negara in the early 1990s, although uncovering their profits and losses from
11It is easy to show that, by plugging the equilibrium monopoly or competitive quotes in the optimal demand
function of type 1 and type 2 investors of Eq. (3), both X1,t and X2,t are equal to zero for X1 = X2. Therefore,
when otherwise identical investors have the same initial endowments, no risk-sharing (hence, no trading) occurs
in the market.
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foreign exchange trading may be a daunting task.12 Lewis (1995) identifies several common
features in the interventions conducted by the Federal Reserve (Fed), Bank of Japan (BoJ),
and Bundesbank (BuBa) on DEMUSD and JPYUSD between 1985 and 1987. First, most of
those actions were aimed at preventing the above exchange rates from moving away from some
target levels. Second, in few but significant cases the interventions went in the opposite direction
with respect to the exchange rate. It is possible that, in these circumstances, the CBs were
attempting either to stabilize fluctuations of their domestic currencies around the target levels,
or to speculate against them by following the trend and, in doing so, preserving their expected
future wealth from depletion. Third, although the intervention events may have been announced
to or observed by the market, the magnitude of the incoming CB orders was usually not, as also
suggested by Goodhart and Hesse (1991), among others.
Policy and wealth-preservation (or speculative) motives may be conflicting. Suppose in fact
that a CB believes, based on its superior knowledge of the domestic economy, that the domestic
currency (USD) is fundamentally overvalued, and that it is reasonable to expect its reversion,
i.e., that St < f . A sudden devaluation however could create excessive inflationary pressures. To
attenuate those pressures, the CB could set an intermediate target level for the exchange rate, S,
between St and f , and sell some amounts of foreign currency (GBP) to prevent the exchange rate
from breaking its current trend too rapidly toward its long-term value. Nonetheless, given its
knowledge of f , the CB’s action, if eﬀective on St, is not properly profit-maximizing (as buying
GBP would be instead) and leads to a reduction of its future expected wealth.
In this paper, we model such trade-oﬀ between management of the exchange rate around
a specified target and wealth-preservation (or speculative) motives in a parsimonious way by
assuming that the CB chooses the net amount of foreign (domestic) currency to buy/sell, XCBt
(BCBt ), that minimizes the following loss function:
L
¡
S,λ
¢
=
£
E (S∗t |zt)− S
¤2 − λE ¡WCBT 0 |zt¢ , (11)
in which WCBT 0 = R
¡
BCBt +Bt
¢
+ F
¡
XCBt +RESt
¢
, subject to the budget constraint
BCBt = −SCBt XCBt , (12)
where zt is the CB’s information set at time t, E (S∗t |zt) = qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t is the expected
transaction price from trading between the dealer(s) and the population of investors, τ ∈ (0, t) is
when the most recent past intervention occurred, and RESt = RESτ+XCBτ and Bt = Bτ+B
CB
τ
are the endowments of foreign and domestic currency-denominated bonds held by the CB at time
t before intervening.13
Let’s examine carefully the loss function of the CB. The first term measures the quadratic dis-
tance betweenE (S∗t |zt) and an exogenously selected target level for the exchange rate. E (S∗t |zt)
is a relevant price, as it represents the expected market-clearing exchange rate that would be
observed if all investors and dealers could trade simultaneously at time t. It is beyond the scope
12Taylor (1995) oﬀers an overview on the economics of oﬃcial interventions. See also Brown (2000) and
Chancellor (2000) for further details on the actions by the Malaysian Central Bank in the 1990s.
13Given that the interval [0, T ] represents a short period of time (e.g., one trading day), we abstract from
the issue of a monetary authority being unable to intervene because of lack of reserves by assuming that the
initial endowments RES0 and B0 are big enough so that RESt > 0 and Bt > 0 before and after an intervention
occurred.
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of this paper to analyze how a target level for the exchange rate is selected and agreed upon
by domestic and foreign monetary authorities; it suﬃces for us to know that the chosen level
S is assumed to guide the CB’s action in the forex market.14 At each point in time t the CB
is myopic, i.e., like the investors, does not expect to return to the market by the end of the
trading period T . This assumption, by implicitly imposing that the CB’s trading activity is
controlled exogenously by the parameter l, allows us to abstract from the complex macro issue of
analyzing its endogenous intertemporal strategic behavior (explored, for example, by Cadenillas
and Zapatero (1999, 2000)) and to make the problem of the monetary authority more tractable,
although at the cost of less realism. We nonetheless decided to bear this cost, given our micro
objective to study the impact of the existence of a (not necessarily profit-maximizing CB) on the
relationship between dealers and investors over a single trading day [0, T ].
The second component of L
¡
S,λ
¢
incorporates what we called the wealth-preservation (or,
alternatively, speculative) motive in the decision process of the CB. Intervention has a cost, and
this cost is obviously higher when CB’s actions are unprofitable from a pure trading perspective.
We assume that actions reducing its expected future wealth are linearly painful for a risk-neutral,
price-taking CB, and use the parameter λ to control for its potential trade-oﬀ between policy
motives and speculation in selecting the optimal size (and sign) of XCBt .
15 The specification
of Eq. (11), with a CB not directly motivated by profit considerations, is similar in spirit to
Stein (1989) and to the objective functions adopted by Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and
Vitale (1999). The budget constraint in Eq. (12) implies that each GBP trade by the CB is
accompanied by an open-market trade in the opposite direction. In addition, as mentioned in
Section 2.1, both the fundamental value of the currency (f) and the realized long-term exchange
rate (ST 0) are drawn by nature independently of any CB action. From these assumptions it
follows that, in our setting, interventions are always sterilized.
Nonetheless, our model does not exogenously impose a relationship between the actions of
the stylized CB and the exchange rate, as, for example, in Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000).
What is then the market friction that allows interventions to be potentially eﬀective in this
economy? The CB uses the market-clearing condition (Eq. (5)) and the investors’ optimal net
demand for GBP-denominated bonds (Eq. (3)) to conjecture that the expected transaction price
qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t is given by
E (S∗t |zt) =
E [f |It]
R
− πX∗ + πLXCBt , (13)
where L = l
1−l .
16 Hence, for a given l > 0, the optimal intervention schedule XCBt for each price
level SCBt minimizes the loss function of Eq. (11) subject to Eq. (13) and the wealth constraint
of Eq. (12). The following result ensues.
14The CB’s loss function can be easily generalized to the case of a target band of fluctuation (SL, SH) for the
currency by specifying the policy term in Eq. (11) as
£
E (S∗t |zt)− 12
¡
SL + SH
¢¤2
, i.e., in terms of movements
of S∗t away from the center of the band.
15Observe that Eq. (11) can alternatively be interpreted as the Lagrangian for the minimization of its pol-
icy component under a wealth constraint. Neely (2000) finds a small but significant correlation between CB
intervention and changes in its reserves of foreign assets.
16Eq. (13) follows straightforwardly from the market-clearing conditionE [Zt|Mt] = 0 when the optimal demand
for GBP of type i, Xi,t, is replaced by the expression in Eq. (3) and the definition for E (S∗t |zt), qS1,t+(1− q)S2,t
(as zt includes q) is applied.
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Proposition 2 With full information and l > 0, the demand function of the CB is given by
XCBt = γ
·
S −
µ
f
R
− πX∗
¶
+
λ
2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢¸
, (14)
where γ = 1
πL
.
Proof. Straightforward from the first order condition of the constrained minimization of the
loss function L
¡
S,λ
¢
described in Eq.(11) with respect to XCBt . The second order condition,
2π2L2 > 0, is always satisfied.
It is evident from Eq. (13) that, ceteris paribus for SCBt , the optimal intervention size declines
for higher l. This means that the less likely is the CB to intervene (or the less frequently the
CB intervenes), the higher is, for a given sign, CB’s order size. Intuitively, a lower l makes the
threat of intervention less significant for the dealers, therefore a bigger XCBt is necessary to move
the expected transaction price toward the target rate S. This property of Eq. (13) is consistent
with some evidence in Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000); indeed, it is there shown that BuBa’s
interventions in the DEMUSD market are more frequent than the Fed’s, but smaller in absolute
dollar size.
The CB’s optimal demand function depends, in a very intuitive fashion, on both the policy
and wealth-preservation motives. The CB needs to buy (sell) the foreign currency to push the
expected transaction rate closer to the target level, if the diﬀerence between S and the price that
would emerge in a purely competitive economy with no monetary authority (l = 0), f
R
−πX∗ , is
positive (negative). If S > f
R
− πX∗, the CB is chasing the trend, i.e., is attempting to induce a
faster depreciation of S∗t toward its long-term fundamental value, hence it buys GBP.
17 If instead
S < f
R
− πX∗, the CB is leaning against the wind, i.e., is attempting to resist S∗t ’s long-term
depreciation trend by selling GBP.18 The second term inXCBt is more properly wealth-preserving.
It in fact implies that the CB buys more GBP-denominated bonds (and simultaneously sells more
dollar-denominated T-bills) if the expected net future value (NFV) in dollars of that investment,
f −RSCBt , is higher. The amounts of GBP bought (or sold) by the GBP depend crucially on λ,
the parameter controlling the trade-oﬀ between policy and speculative motives. This trade-oﬀ is
not surprisingly highest when the monetary authority is trying to lean against the wind and, in
doing so, is reducing its expected future wealth.
The likelihood of an order to arrive from the monetary authority (l) and the elasticity of
investors’ demand for GBP (π) aﬀect (via γ) the impact of both motives on the size of the CB
orders, consistently with the intuition of the portfolio balance theories of CB intervention. If
l goes up, the CB needs to trade a smaller amount of currency to achieve its objectives, since
its trade has a bigger impact on the expected transaction price S∗t , as evident from Eq. (13).
17In particular, if S > fR we say that the CB is riding the wave, i.e., is aggressively pursuing a depreciation of
the dollar beyond the long-term risk-neutral rate fR . We already observed that such competitive devaluations are
explicitly forbidden by the IMF Article 4, Section 1.
18In Section 2.1 we assumed that R > 1 and RF = 1 (or, more generally, RFR < 1). If we had assumed
that R < 1 (or RFR > 1) insomuch that, when l = 0, the dollar were weaker than its long-term expected value
(S∗,l=0t > E [ST 0 ] = f), then the CB would be chasing the trend if S <
f
R − πX∗, and leaning against the wind if
S > fR − πX∗. For simplicity, we ignore this possibility and concentrate just on the scenario in which R > 1.
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Moreover, ceteris paribus for SCBt , if investors are more risk-averse (higher α), if there is more
uncertainty surrounding the long-term exchange rate F (higher σ2F ), or if investors have a higher
expected endowment of GBP (higher X∗), then their demand for GBP is less elastic. Hence, a
bigger increase (decrease) in the potential prices is needed to induce them to hold more (less)
GBP and push St toward the high (low) S. Therefore, a bigger positive (negative) intervention
is necessary. It is also easy to verify that XCBt depends positively on the selected target level, on
the NFV of investing in GBP-denominated assets, and on the expected individual endowment
level X∗, but negatively on the quoted rate SCBt .
3 The full information case
In this section, we allow the CB to intervene with its orders XCBt . We then solve for the resulting
equilibrium quotes for monopoly and competition among currency dealers, and present our first
set of results under the assumption of full information, i.e., that all agents know all parameters of
the economy (in particular l, S, and f), demand functions, and past order flow. Full information
restricts the eﬀectiveness of CB’s actions to the portfolio balance channel where investors (if
risk-averse, as in our model) have to be compensated for having to hold more (or less) of the
foreign currency than they otherwise would if l = 0.
We construct the equilibrium in three steps. We first assume that in equilibrium dealers can
always distinguish whether the incoming order is from a CB or from the population of investors,
that they can just conjecture the investor’s type from the size and sign of his observed order, and
that they use this knowledge to formulate their reservation prices for each potential arrival.19
We also assume that the CB conjectures an expression for the expected transaction price in its
loss function L
¡
S,λ
¢
. Second, we compute type 1 and type 2 agents’ optimal demands for GBP-
denominated bonds and the optimal intervention at the reservation prices S1,t, S2,t, and SCBt .
Finally, we show that the resulting investors’ orders, given those prices, are indeed diﬀerent,
and that E [S∗t |zt] is indeed equal to qS1,t+ (1− q)S2,t, confirming the dealers’ and CB’s initial
guesses, respectively, as in classic fixed-point problems.
The full information hypothesis also implies that all agents (including investors) not only
know exactly XCBt of Eq. (14) but also observe the size of the trade executed by the CB.
Available empirical evidence (in particular Goodhart and Hesse (1991), Lewis (1995), and Peiers
(1997)) seems to suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, we choose to use this simplified scenario to
explain the basic intuition for how dealers adjust their quotes in response to the (likelihood of)
arrival of a CB order, and to understand why the adjustment does (or does not) induce a change
in the spreads with respect to the basic case of Eq. (6) to (10). In ,Section 4 we eventually
introduce information asymmetry among agents regarding some of the model’s parameters and
more realistic assumptions for their information sets, and study the impact of interventions on
the process of price formation when the signaling channel of eﬀectiveness is active as well.
19This assumption is reasonable, because it captures two typical aspects of OTC currency markets: lack of
anonymous trading and, consequently, price discrimination. For more on the trading relationship between the
CB and MMs for the domestic currency, see Peiers (1997).
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3.1 The monopolist dealer
We showed in Proposition 1 that a monopolist dealer widens an otherwise zero spread (in absence
of inventory control or information asymmetry), centered around the competitive equilibrium
exchange rate f
R
− πX∗, to induce positive expected instantaneous profit from trading. What
happens if we now introduce the possibility for the CB to hit the dealer with an order? Is the
dealer’s incentive to extract rents from investors somehow limited or enhanced by the likelihood
of CB intervention being positive? The problem of the monopolist dealer is now
max
S1,t,S2,t,SCBt
(1− l) qX1,tS1,t + (1− l) (1− q)X2,tS2,t + lXCBt SCBt
s.t. E [Zt|Mt] = (1− l) qX1,t + (1− l) (1− q)X2,t + lXCBt = 0
XCBt = γ
£
S − ¡ f
R
− πX∗¢+ λ
2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢¤
Xi,t =
1
π
¡
f
R
− Si,t
¢−X i i = 1, 2.
(15)
Equilibrium construction in this setting generates the following result.
Proposition 3 With full information and l > 0, the monopolist MM’s reservation bid and ask
quotes at any point in time t, before an investor’s order arrives, are
S1,t = S
l=0
1,t + πLX
CB
t (16)
S2,t = S
l=0
2,t + πLX
CB
t , (17)
while the reservation exchange rate if a CB intervenes at t is given by
SCBt = ω1
f
r
+ ω2S + ω3πX
∗. (18)
The resulting absolute bid-ask spread is unchanged with respect to the benchmark of Eq. (10).
The proportional spread does instead change, and is now equal to
PSt =
S2,t − S1,t
MS∗t
=
π
¡
X1 −X2
¢
2
³
S∗,l=0t + πLXCBt
´ . (19)
Proof. See the Appendix. The proportional spread is computed using the “true” expected
transaction price MS∗t , and not the conventional mid-quote, because the probability that an
investor’s order is of type 1 (q) is public information.
In short, Proposition 3 says that in equilibrium the monopolist dealer revises upward (down-
ward) his quotes, with respect to the benchmark case of Proposition 1 (l = 0), if there is a
positive probability that the CB will intervene at time t buying (selling) the foreign currency,
i.e., if XCBt > 0 (X
CB
t < 0). The absolute spread is unchanged, while the proportional spread
declines (increases) for an expected positive (negative) CB order. The quote revision is given by
∆Si,t = ∆S
∗
t = πLX
CB
t =
πL
2πL+ λR
µ
S − f
R
¶
+
π
2
X∗. (20)
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What is the intuition for this result? Let’s assume that it becomes known to the dealer (or
that the CB, by assumption truthful, announces) that from time t onward, with probability l > 0,
an order XCBt > 0 might arrive. Given the original set of quotes, S
l=0
i,t , this potential buy order
creates an imbalance in the expected instantaneous dealer’s inventory by adding to the originally
flat position a negative drift component. In order for Eq. (5) to be satisfied or, equivalently, in
order to clear the market, the MM increases S1,t, the bid price at which he is willing to buy from
net sellers, to reduce the size of the expected incoming sales, and S2,t, the ask price at which he
is willing to sell to net buyers, to increase the size of the expected incoming purchases. Because
at the revised quotes net buyers buy less and net sellers sell more, investors’ net demand is now
expected to be a sale. This allows the dealer to clear the market when the CB is expected to be
a net buyer of GBP. The magnitude of ∆Si,t depends positively on the relative likelihood of CB
intervention (L) and on the elasticity of investors’ demand for GBP-denominated assets (via π),
as in portfolio balance models. ∆Si,t is also symmetric, i.e., identical for both bid and oﬀer, so
to leave the absolute spread unchanged.
The bid-ask spread remains positive and unchanged because the MM is still trying to maxi-
mize his expected net cash flow from trading. The expected transaction price MS∗t does however
increase, and the proportional spread declines. Vice versa, if the CB order were of negative sign,
quotes would be revised downward symmetrically, the expected transaction price would decrease,
so the proportional spread increase. Thus, in our setting the announcement of a fully expected
CB intervention does have an impact on quotes and PSt, and the direction of such impact de-
pends on the expected sign of the CB trade. There are two reasons why this happens in our
economy. First, although the probability of intervention is declared to every player, at each point
in time t the dealer still faces uncertainty about which order (investor versus monetary author-
ity) is going to arrive. This uncertainty is embedded in the quotes’ revisions via L. Second, the
market-clearing constraint is binding. If XCBt > 0 (X
CB
t < 0), the dealer is expecting extra cash
inflows (outflows) from the CB, i.e., is anticipating an increase (decrease) of his expected net
revenues from trading at time t, E [Πt|Mt]. If the market had not to be cleared, the monopolist
currency dealer would set quotes allowing him to retain the extra gain (to pass the extra cost)
from CB intervention from (to) the population of investors. But this is not the case here: because
investors’ demand for the GBP-denominated asset is less than perfectly elastic, the no-expected
net inventory condition obliges the dealer to give up some of the extra cash inflows (not to pass
all the extra cash outflows) to investors in order to have E [Zt|Mt] = 0. To do so, the dealer
reduces (increases) the proportional spread.
As suggested by Eq. (20), CB intervention is eﬀective in moving the expected transaction
price by an amount ∆Si,t toward S. In Figure 1 we plot the behavior of MS∗t for diﬀerent levels
of l, for a parametrization such that the CB is chasing the trend (S > f
R
− πX∗).20 In this
example, ∆Si,t induces an undershooting (overshooting) of MS∗t with respect to the target level
S if the likelihood of intervention is relatively high (low). This occurs because for high (low)
values of l the monetary authority is expected to hit the dealer with a smaller (bigger) order size
in order to achieve its objectives. In fact, at higher (lower) frequency L the MM has more (less)
scope to exploit his market power versus the CB (i.e., to maximize his profits while still clearing
20In all the simulations that follow in this paper, model’s parameters are always chosen to ensure that the
resulting ratio between the expected absolute size of investors’ and CB orders is as similar as possible to available
empirical estimates (roughly 12%).
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the market); consequently he charges a higher (lower) SCBt , thus making the intervention more
(less) expensive. The ensuing smaller (bigger) NFV of buying GBP reduces (increases) CB’s
incentive to weaken the dollar, hence the endogenously determined magnitude of its intervention
operation. This eﬀect is reinforced by the inverse relation between XCBt and L (for a given S
CB
t )
described in Section 3.4. Therefore, the needed adjustment in the bid and oﬀer rates to clear the
market is bigger (smaller). Indeed, it is easy to show that, for any S < f
R
, ∂∆S
∗
t
∂l
< 0.
Because MS∗t = S
∗,l=0
t +∆S
∗
t , we can interpret the first derivative of ∆S
∗
t with respect to any
of the parameters controlling CB’s motives as measures of the price impact of its actions in the
market. In particular, from Eq. (20) we compute ∂
MS∗t
∂XCBt
= πL; thus, the ratio ασ
2
FL
R
represents the
inverse of the relative market depth of the market (as in Kyle (1985)), a measure of how much
the expected exchange rate moves from the no-intervention price f
R
− πX∗ if there is a positive
likelihood that the monetary authority is willing to transact one unit of GBP-denominated bonds
at time t (l > 0). Not surprisingly, the currency market is less deep (from the CB’s viewpoint),
the price impact is higher, and the intervention is more eﬀective when the coeﬃcient of risk-
aversion, α, and the volatility of the long-term value of GBP, σ2F , are higher, when the return
paid by the riskless domestic bond is lower (as the underlying depreciation trend for the domestic
currency is weaker, hence easier to challenge), or when the likelihood of government action is
higher. Indeed, in such circumstances the monopolist dealer needs a bigger quote revision to clear
the market for the same expected incoming CB trade, for example when risk-averse investors
face more uncertainty surrounding nature’s choice for f , and therefore their demand elasticity is
lower.
Eventually, when the intervention does happen, that is if the incoming order is the one
from the CB, there is no additional impact on quotes and spreads. This occurs because in full
information the market is strong-form eﬃcient and CB actions do not aﬀect investors and dealers’
beliefs about the fundamental value of the currency. In other words, as soon as the intervention
is announced (and l becomes positive) the dealer immediately and fully discounts this news in
prices and spreads. However, in our setting trading is sequential and the market does not clear
just once. Hence, the expected transaction price returns immediately to the pre-intervention
levels as soon as l is again equal to zero, because then no new investor needs to be rewarded
(penalized) for having to hold more GBP than they otherwise would in the absence of active
currency management by the government. Therefore, the impact of CB intervention remains on
quotes and transaction prices just as long as the (exogenous) threat of arrival of orders from the
monetary authority is present.
3.2 The competitive dealers
In this subsection we consider the case of competitive forex dealers, i.e., of dealers with no market
power. We have shown in Proposition 1 that in such a circumstance, and under the assumptions
of no inventory control, order processing costs, or information asymmetry, no spread arises in the
resulting stylized currency market when l = 0. Does that conclusion still hold if we introduce
the positive likelihood of CB intervention at each point in time t? Along the lines of Section 3,
the equilibrium set of rates S1,t, S2,t, and SCBt is the one that, given investors’ (Xi,t) and CB’s
(XCBt ) optimal demand functions, satisfies both E [Πt|Mt] = 0 and E [Zt|Mt] = 0. Competition
among dealers drives the instantaneous expected net revenues from trading to zero, while the
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market-clearing condition still applies. These two restrictions are not suﬃcient to identify three
reservation prices, hence we express the bid and oﬀer quotes as functions of a free variable, SCBt .
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 4 With full information and l > 0, the competitive MMs’ reservation bid and ask
quotes at any point in time t, as a function of SCBt , before an investor’s order arrives, are
S1,t = S
l=0
1,t + πLX
CB
t −
hπ
2
(1− q) ¡X1 −X2¢− π
2
(Γ)
i
(21)
S2,t = S
l=0
2,t + πLX
CB
t +
·
πq
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− πq
2 (1− q) (Γ)
¸
, (22)
where Γ > 0 is given in the Appendix. A spread between the oﬀer and the bid quotes does exists
and is given by
S2,t − S1,t = π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− π
2 (1− q) (Γ) . (23)
The sign and size of the spread depend on the selected parametrization of the economy. There
exists a price SCBt = S
CB
t (∗) such that, for XCBt 6= 0, the above spread is equal to zero:
SCBt (∗) = S1,t = S2,t =
µ
2πL
2πL+ λR
¶
S +
µ
λ
2πL+ λR
¶
f . (24)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 contains several implications of the introduction of a CB in the competitive
forex dealership scenario. As in the monopoly case, the new equilibrium bid and ask quotes
diﬀer from the prices reported in Proposition 1. Let’s examine them more carefully. The chosen
S1,t and S2,t depend on three diﬀerent components, one of which,
f
R
− πX∗, is the competitive
price arising when l = 0 and investors’ orders are cleared all at once. As such, this is our
benchmark exchange rate. The remaining two are revisions induced by the positive likelihood
of the CB to arrive. One of them, πLXCBt , aﬀects symmetrically both bid and oﬀer quotes.
This is the adjustment that is needed to clear the market when l and XCBt are diﬀerent from
zero, and is similar, albeit not in magnitude to what we observed in the monopolistic scenario.
If, for example, the CB is known to plan a sale of foreign currency (XCBt < 0) to strengthen
the dollar toward a given low S, dealers decrease the exchange rate at which they are willing
to trade in order to achieve two related objectives. First, at the new levels, type 2 (type 1)
investors will demand (oﬀer) bigger amounts of GBP-denominated bonds. Second, the resulting
expected exchange rate CS∗t will be closer to the target S, thus reducing X
CB
t . Indeed, X
CB
t is
endogenously determined in our model, hence is crucially aﬀected by where prices are expected
to move. In other words, if quotes are symmetrically revised downward, the lower CS∗t induces
a smaller intervention, while investors will be buying more GBP than they would have if l = 0,
thus facilitating the dealers’ eﬀorts to have a driftless expected inventory.
The exogenous price impact of CB intervention on the expected exchange rate (defined in
Section 3.1 as ∂S
∗
t
∂XCBt
) is unaﬀected by the dealers’ degree of market power. In fact, it ensues from
the equilibrium quotes in Proposition 4 that CS∗t = E [S
∗
t |Mt] is given by S∗,l=0t + πLXCBt , and
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that consequently ∂
CS∗t
∂XCBt
= πL = ∂
MS∗t
∂XCBt
. This occurs because the market-clearing condition is
binding for both the monopolist and the competitive MMs. However, the equilibrium optimal
XCBt arises endogenously from the model; thus,
MXCBt is generally diﬀerent from
CXCBt , and
so is MS∗t from
CS∗t , as we discuss in greater detail in the next subsection. Most interestingly,
l > 0 induces a wedge between bid and oﬀer quotes: indeed, the bid-ask spread (in Eq. (23))
is generally diﬀerent from zero, unless either SCBt = S
CB
t (∗) or l = 0. To interpret this result,
remember that our assumption of otherwise frictionless trading implies a benchmark zero spread
when l = 0 (Proposition 1). Therefore, by relaxing that assumption, we could more properly
consider Eq. (23) as the change of an otherwise positive spread resulting from other market
frictions.
What is the intuition behind the insurgence of a positive (negative) wedge when l > 0 and
SCBt 6= SCBt (∗)? The basic idea is that if the truthful monetary authority announces it will
intervene in the future, risk-neutral dealers revise their quotes for two specific reasons. First,
as previously suggested, they have to increase (decrease) both the bid and the ask to ensure
that, for an expected positive (negative) intervention, the market still clears, i.e., to ensure that
their expected instantaneous inventory is still driftless, as in the monopoly case. Second, the
competitive pressure among dealers obliges them to pass all extra revenues (costs) resulting from
the potential arrival of a positive (negative) CB order onto the population of investors. The
given elasticity of investors’ demand for GBP then determines whether this eﬀort eventually
induces a positive or a negative wedge between the new bid and ask quotes.21 For l = 0, as we
have seen in Section 2.3, competition erodes completely the positive spread arising when dealers,
holding significant market power, attempt to extract rents from the trading process. Indeed,
Γ = (1− q) ¡X1 −X2¢ and S2,t − S1,t = 0 when l = 0. If instead l > 0, further asymmetric
quotes’ revisions, thus a spread may be needed to transfer any additional cash inflow or outflow
induced by the expected CB actions to the investors, because domestic and foreign currency-
denominated bonds are not perfectly substitutable for risk-averse type 1 and type 2 traders.
Not surprisingly, as Γ > 0, such wedge is always lower than the absolute spread set by a
monopolistic dealer, π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
, because of competition eroding the MMs’ ability to extract
rents from providing liquidity to the market. Therefore, the more binding is the no-profit con-
dition, E [Πt|Mt] = 0, the smaller the competitive spread will be with respect to π2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
.
Consequently, for a given and exogenous XCBt , the terms
π
2
(Γ) and − πq
2(1−q) (Γ) in S1,t and S2,t,
respectively, can be interpreted as the eﬀect of the binding no-profit condition on the monop-
olistic quotes of Section 3.1. The wedge in Eq. (23) also depends crucially on the parameters
controlling CB’s optimal intervention schedule, because XCBt is not exogenous in our model. For
example, a more (less) intense trade-oﬀ between policy and wealth-preservation motives in the
CB’s loss function L
¡
S,λ
¢
may endogenously induce smaller (bigger) interventions, hence easing
the pressure for competing dealers to even out expected cash inflows and outflows from trading.
Finally, the price at which the bid-ask wedge is equal to zero, SCBt (∗) in Eq. (24), is a
weighted sum of the target rate S and the long-term fundamental value of the currency f , and
is equal to the expected transaction price S∗t . Therefore, if either the CB decides to pursue
a more aggressive devaluation policy for the domestic currency or wealth-preservation becomes
21Observe incidentally that, in this model, the apparent arbitrage opportunity oﬀered by a negative wedge
cannot be exploited by the investors, as they arrive to the forex market just one at the time, can trade with the
dealers just once, and do not return.
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more relevant in its loss function, its optimal intervention schedule XCBt shifts upward and the
MMs have to transact with the monetary authority (and the population of investors) at a higher
price. The ensuing ∆SCBt (∗) > 0 in fact prevents the dealers from retaining any additional cash
inflow from CB trades, thus from having to impose a spread, while still clearing the market.
To clarify the interpretation of the multiple equilibria of Proposition 4, we parametrize the
model for a CB chasing the trend and leaning against the wind, and report in Figure 2 the
resulting spread and XCBt for diﬀerent ls. We start by setting the free parameter S
CB
t equal to
the target level S. Later, we consider the issue of how sensitive is the analysis that follows to this
assumption. Here we comment uniquely on the case of a CB chasing the trend (Figure 2a). The
same reasoning however applies for a CB trying to resist that trend (Figure 2b). The positive
likelihood of an intervention induces a positive spread, but such wedge is declining for increasing
l, as so is the size of the positive expected CB order. As we suggested above, both bid and ask
quotes go up in response to XCBt > 0. The dealers need in fact to receive bigger sell orders and
smaller buy orders from the investors to clear the market.
A positive expected CB order not only creates a potential imbalance in the dealers’ inventory
but also allows them to enjoy a potential increase of their net revenues at any point in time.
Each single dealer would then try to modify slightly the bid and ask quotes, and the reservation
rate for the CB order, in order to monopolize the trading flow while keeping the market clear.
Competitive pressure from a multitude of dealers does eventually lead the quotes at steady state
levels where both the expected instantaneous inventory drift (−Zt) and the expected instanta-
neous net revenues from trading (Πt) are equal to zero. The resulting spread is positive because,
for the given set of parameters (and the implying investors’ demand elasticity), those positive
extra revenues from the CB have to be passed onto the population of investors, while SCBt cannot
be reduced, as it is fixed by assumption at S. Indeed, at the given endowment ratio (X1
X2
= 3) type
1 investors are bigger “net sellers” than otherwise identical type 2 investors are “net buyers.” A
positive spread therefore arises, for the dealers can achieve a net negative outflow of cash from
the investors (that is (1− l) qX1,tS1,t + (1− l) (1− q)X2,tS2,t < 0) to compensate the positive
expected net cash inflow from the CB (lXCBt S
CB
t > 0) just by revising upward the ask more
than the bid.
Figure 3a displays the spread and net revenue components for investors of both types and the
CB for increasing values of X1, hence of the endowment ratio. For higherX1, type 1 investors are
more sensitive to changes in the exchange rate at which they would sell some GBP-denominated
assets. Thus, the spread increases, as a smaller ∆S1,t with respect to ∆S2,t is needed to have
a bigger sell order from type 1 investors and ensure that both the expected instantaneous drift
and profit are equal to zero. Revenues from type 2 investors are steady, while the cash outflow
from type 1 investors is bigger (in absolute terms) to compensate the inflow from the CB order.
It is worth observing that in this example [qX1,tS1,t + (1− q)X2,tS2,t] < 0: the competitive
dealers are incurring an expected net loss (cash outflow) versus the population of investors to
compensate for the gains (cash inflow) they are earning versus the CB. In other words, CB
intervention is transferring rents to investors to induce them to hold more GBP-denominated
bonds, but the dealers are unable to retain even part of these rents, as instead was happening
in the case of a monopolist MM. However, if SCBt is fixed at S
CB
t (∗), then the opposite eﬀect
occurs: even under extreme competitive pressure, dealers do not pass any of the costs or revenues
from trading with the CB onto the population of investors. The higher potential price charged to
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the monetary authority lowers CB demand for GBP, and the absolute spread remains unchanged
(at zero). If all three potential prices were allowed to change, then we would expect a smaller
absolute spread than in the case of Figure 2a, but nonetheless diﬀerent from zero. As expected,
the intensity of these eﬀects is reduced for increasing l, as it implies smaller CB orders.
How sensitive are the sign and size of the absolute spread in Figure 2a to the initial assumption
that SCBt is fixed at S? To answer this question, we plot in Figure 3b (for l = 0.03 and
X1
X2
= 3) the
wedge of Eq. (23) for diﬀerent values of SCBt , centered around S
CB
t (∗). Such wedge is negative for
any SCBt > S
CB
t (∗). Why is this occurring? First, the fact that XCBt is not particularly sensitive
to changes in the rate at which CB’s order is transacted, although the NFV of buying GBP
(f −RSCBt ) is declining, suggests that, for our selected set of parameters, the wealth-preserving
motives are weighted less than currency management in the loss function of Eq. (11). However,
for higher SCBt , potential revenues from the CB are higher as well. Competitive dealers then
need to suﬀer more cash outflows versus the population of investors, or need to make them more
net sellers to pass to them these increasing rents, while still clearing the market. To do so, they
raise more the bid quote, with respect to the ask, as type 1 investors are the needed net sellers.
When SCBt > S
CB
t (∗), the quote revision on the bid becomes higher than on the oﬀer, and a
negative spread might be observed. Along the same lines, S2,t − S1,t < 0 for any SCBt > SCBt (∗)
if the CB were leaning against the wind.
The results of Proposition 4 convey very strikingly the intuition of imperfect substitutability
as the only channel of eﬀectiveness for CB intervention in a world of full information. It also
suggests that, even when no information asymmetry among market participants is assumed, the
impact of actions and announcements of the monetary authority on quotes and spreads is less
trivial and more complicated than previously believed. Even a fully anticipated announcement
(or arrival) of a CB order for the same size and sign may have diﬀerent eﬀects on quotes and
spreads, depending not only on the degree of market power held by the dealers but also on the
investors’ current demand elasticity.
3.3 A primer on the eﬀectiveness of CB intervention
We showed in the previous subsections that the introduction of a rational, but not necessarily
profit-maximizing CB has a significant impact on the process of intraday price formation in the
forex markets, even under the assumption of full information, when all risk-averse investors’
orders do not arrive simultaneously but hit the dealers’ screens one after the other. Indeed, one
of the novelties of this paper is to extend the classic portfolio balance setting (with imperfect
substitutability of domestic and foreign currency-denominated assets), previously restricted to
a stylized market clearing just once, to the more realistic assumption of sequential trading. In
particular, we showed that CB interventions may have both temporary and persistent eﬀects on
the exchange rate depending on l, the likelihood of the next order being from the CB.
Such eﬀects are temporary because they disappears as soon as l = 0, but may instead remain
in the quotes for as long as the threat of future CB trades is significant and credible, i.e., for as
long as l > 0. Prices are initially revised because, at a specific point in time, dealers learn to
face the arrival of a potential order by the monetary authority. Instantaneous market clearing
forces them to eﬀectively pass the order to incoming investors. As those investors are risk-averse,
a risk premium is needed to compensate them for holding diﬀerent positions from what they
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otherwise would if l = 0. This adjustment is temporary if l immediately goes back to zero, since
compensation is no longer needed for new potentially arriving investors. The eﬀect is instead
persistent if l remains positive for several trading rounds, as for each of them incoming investors
have to be compensated for the possibility of having to rebalance their optimal portfolios.
The eﬀects of CB actions on equilibrium quotes also depend crucially on the degree of market
power held by the currency dealers. In the extreme scenario of a monopolist MM, the absolute
spread is unchanged by CB intervention. It trivially ensues from Propositions 3 and 4 that the
expected transaction price induced by l > 0 is given by
MS∗t =
µ
f
R
− πX∗
¶
+
πL
2πL+ λR
µ
S − f
R
¶
+
π
2
X∗ (25)
in the case of a monopolist MM (MS∗t ), and by
CS∗t = S +
λ
2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
(26)
when instead dealers compete for the next incoming trade (CS∗t ). We measure the relative
eﬀectiveness of interventions under the two regimes by computing the variable EMt as
EMt =
¡
MS∗t − S
¢2 − ¡CS∗t − S¢2 . (27)
Positive values for EMt indicate that the threat of the arrival of CB trades pushes the expected
transaction price closer to the objective S when the competitive scenario of Section 3.2 applies.
We have then the following proposition.
Proposition 5 With full information and l > 0, CB interventions are maximally eﬀective when
SCBt is equal to the risk-neutral price
f
R
, i.e., when the NFV of currency trading (f − RSCBt )
is equal to zero for the monetary authority. CB interventions are always more eﬀective for
competitive MMs if wealth-preservation has no weight in the loss function L
¡
S,λ
¢
(λ = 0).
When instead λ > 0, the same is true only if the absolute NFV of currency trading for the CB
is “small” and/or if λ is “small.”
Proof. See the Appendix, where we also show that, if λ is “small” or if there is no trade-oﬀ
between wealth-preservation and policy motives in selecting XCBt , the CB is always better oﬀ
when dealers compete for the incoming trade, i.e., LC
¡
S,λ
¢
< LM
¡
S,λ
¢
.
That the eﬀectiveness of intervention is generally hindered by GBP trading being a positive
NFV decision should not be surprising, given the attitude of our stylized CB toward final wealth
in its loss function. Indeed, if wealth-preservation motives are conflicting with achieving the
target S, that trade-oﬀ shifts downward the CB’s optimal intervention schedule for each SCBt .
If instead wealth-preservation and policy motives reinforce each other, the resulting expected
transaction price S∗t may overshoot S. In addition, interventions tend to be more eﬀective when
the degree of dealers’ market power is minimal. When such market power is significant, MMs’
quest for profit maximization prevents interventions from being fully eﬀective. The monopolist
dealer in fact does not adjust his quotes completely in order to be able to extract some rents from
the CB, or to pass most of the costs of intervention onto investors. Consequently, the absolute
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size of the expected XCBt is smaller, and the intervention is less eﬀective. When instead there is
a multitude of dealers, costs and revenues resulting from CB action are transmitted fully to the
population of investors, and quotes’ revisions are more substantial.
How general is this result? Speculative motives induce the CB to buy (sell) more or less
foreign currency than it otherwise would to push S∗t toward S. Hence, they may significantly
aﬀect the impact of the intervention schedule on the exchange rate. From Proposition 5, it is clear
that when wealth-preservation does not condition the CB’s decision process (λ = 0) intervention
is unequivocally more eﬀective in the competitive scenario. In that case in fact the CB is a pure
price-manipulator interested in managing the currency at any cost, thus oﬀering the monopolist
MM more opportunities to extract rents from the CB’s activity, by not fully adjusting S∗t toward
S. Therefore, the resulting MS∗t is equal to a simple average of S and S
∗,l=0
t , while
CS∗t shifts
promptly to S.
When instead λ > 0, there are some circumstances in which the reverse might be true (and
EMt < 0). Proposition 5 tells us that this could occur when the role of wealth-preservation in
the formulation of the optimal intervention schedule XCBt is “very important,” i.e., when it is
“very profitable” to trade currencies and/or CB’s loss function is “very sensitive” to the impact
of its activity in the forex markets on its final wealth WCBT 0 . In fact, when wealth-preservation
motives are significant, either because the opportunity cost of not trading in currencies is “high”
or because λ is “big” (i.e., when our CB is less a price-manipulator and more a risk-neutral spec-
ulator), there is less room for the monopolist dealer to use his market power to extract rent from
a more wealth-conscious monetary authority using its quotes. Moreover, when dealers compete
for the next incoming trade, the smaller weight for policy motives in the CB’s loss function is
discounted integrally in bid and ask prices. This makes the resulting expected transaction price
less responsive to the target level S.
Is the impact of diﬀerent degrees of market power on the distance between S∗t and S econom-
ically significant? As an additional example, we report in Figure 4 the eﬀect of a CB chasing the
trend on the expected transaction price as a function of the likelihood of intervention l for the
two extreme cases of monopolist and competitive MMs. Quotes and intervention sizes for the
competitive case are evaluated at SCBt (∗), i.e., at the rate at which the bid-ask spread is zero,
for the results of the simulation not to be aﬀected by arbitrary choices for the free parameter
SCBt . Because S >
f
R
− πX∗, the CB is buying GBP in the attempt to induce a devaluation
of the dollar. The expected transaction price CS∗t gets closer to the target level S, although
initially with some overshooting at low ls, and converges to it for higher values of l. In a market
where there is a monopolist dealer, the intervention is least eﬀective. Indeed, MS∗t undershoots
the target level and never approaches it for increasing l.
At the same time, the absolute size of the endogenously determined CB order tends to be
higher in the competitive scenario, but the diﬀerence shrinks when the arrival of such order
is more likely. This occurs because SCBt (∗) (Eq. (24)) is lower than SCBt in Eq. (18), hence
the expected NFV of buying GBP-denominated bonds and selling dollar-denominated T-bills
(f −RSCBt ) is higher. In other words, when dealers compete for the incoming trade, and l and
SCBt are low, wealth-preservation reinforces the CB’s resolve to weaken the domestic currency.
Overshooting of CS∗t with respect to S may ensue, as in this case. When instead dealers’ market
power is significant, f −RSCBt is smaller and may even become negative, thus inducing a trade-
oﬀ between the pursuit of S and speculation. Consequently, MS∗t undershoots S. Although
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empirical evidence on the relationship between eﬀectiveness of intervention and degree of market
power is scarce, and mostly anecdotal, there appears to be consensus over the fact that more
frequent, more successful, and larger interventions are observed for heavily traded currencies in
quasi-competitive market settings, with respect to the case of less intermediated exchange rates
of emerging economies.22
4 Information asymmetry
We have proceeded so far in a world of full information. This restrictive assumption allowed
us to explore a single channel through which intervention aﬀects transaction prices, imperfect
substitutability, and to focus on its impact on quotes and spreads. Full information prevented
CB intervention from having any information content. Hence, it prevented us from examining
the information asymmetry channel of currency management eﬀectiveness. Through this second
channel, according to the economic literature mentioned in Section 1, actions by the monetary
authority, by conveying fundamental information and thus aﬀecting the market’s beliefs and
their dispersion, may have a more persistent eﬀect on quotes and, we add, spreads, beyond
the revisions induced by portfolio balance considerations. In this section we fill this gap by
introducing information asymmetry related to CB intervention, in particular by introducing
uncertainty about the Central Bank’s objective (S), the fundamental value of the currency (f),
and the likelihood of intervention (l).23
In particular, we examine a stylized case in which all those forms of uncertainty interact, and
study their combined impact on quotes and spreads with respect to the two benchmark cases
of no intervention (Proposition 1) and intervention with full information (Section 3). Although
the main focus of our analysis is on the eﬀects of information asymmetry between dealers (and
investors) and the CB, we also consider the possibility that (as suggested by Goodhart and Hesse
(1991) and Lewis (1995), among others) not all agents are able to immediately observe the arrival
of an intervention, or its magnitude. This implies that investors may update their beliefs with a
delay with respect to the dealers, and just after having observed the new resulting transaction
prices. Hence, heterogeneity of otherwise identical beliefs may arise.
To deal with information asymmetry, we need some additional terminology and few additional
assumptions. We define Mt, It, and zt as the information sets available to dealers, investors,
and CB at t, respectively. It and zt contain all past transaction prices S1,t−j or S2,t−j and the
corresponding orders Xi,t−j, while Mt also includes units of foreign currency traded by the CB
up to (but excluding) time t.24 Because our stylized dealers do not maximize expected utility of
future wealth, they do not need to formulate beliefs about the future fundamental value of the
22See, for example, Brown (2000) and Chancellor (2000) for anecdotal evidence on the actions of Asian monetary
authorities during the crisis of 1997 and 1998, and Moloney (2000) on interventions by G-7 CBs over the past 25
years.
23CBs may not, and usually do not declare explicitly the degree of resolution of their trade-oﬀ between policy
and wealth-preserving motives (λ) as well. We explored the issue of uncertainty surrounding λ in a previous
version of this paper, and found that its implications for quotes and spreads were substantially similar to those
deriving from uncertainty surrounding S and f .
24This occurs because investors observe the rate at which their order at time t is going to be transacted, Si,t,
only after they arrive to the dealers with their demand schedule Xi,t, according to the exogenous orderly point
process G (t).
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currency. However, being in the business of making and clearing the market, they need to learn
investors’ beliefs about f . For sake of simplicity, we assume that dealers know exactly those
beliefs, and so does the CB,25 but still formulate their own beliefs about f to estimate the sign
and size of the policy and wealth-preserving components in the incoming CB order.
As a result of information asymmetry surrounding S, f , and/or l, the actions of the monetary
authority can surprise the market for their direction and magnitude (thus being unexpected, along
the lines of Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000)), and/or for their timing (thus being unannounced).
Therefore, as in Section 3.4, in the reminder of the paper we also study the eﬀectiveness of the
announcement of an intervention and of its eventual arrival on the exchange rate, in terms of its
speed of adjustment toward the target level, in terms of its proximity to that target, and finally
in terms of its persistence around it over time.
4.1 The extended model
We start by providing a two-step stylized representation of the underlying economic process
leading to CB intervention: we assume that at t = 0 nature first exogenously chooses f , the
mean long-term value of the currency, between fH and fL (fH > fL), with probability pf and
(1−pf), respectively, then picks the two parameters controlling the currency management policy
of the monetary authority, the target level S, between SH and SL (SH > SL), and the likelihood
of intervention l. If nature chooses fH (fL), then S = SH (S = SL) with probability ψ known
to all market participants. Hence, the parameter ψ can be interpreted as a measure of the
correlation between the fundamental value of the currency and the currency management policy
selected by the CB, or alternatively of the consistency of that policy with the basic economic
factors driving the long-term behavior of the exchange rate. For ψ > 1
2
there is a positive “true”
correlation between f and S, i.e., the pairs (fH , SH) and (fL, SL) are more likely than (fH ,
SL) and (fL, SH), respectively. A ψ < 12 instead implies that f and S are negatively correlated.
Finally, if ψ = 1
2
it is equally probable that, for a given f , S is going to be high or low, i.e., the
fundamental value of the exchange rate and the policy motive in the CB’s loss function are ex
ante uncorrelated.
We also assume that the CB, aware of S and l, is going to be better informed about nature’s
choice for f than the rest of the market just with probability v. This implies that not in all
circumstances CB trades may be informative about f . In fact, with probability (1− v), the
CB formulates its intervention based on the true S and on its belief about what f should be,
E
£
f |zUt
¤
, where zUt is the information set of the uninformed CB.26 When uninformed, the
monetary authority knows that no trade can be informative about f , hence it never updates its
original expectation after observing the flow of executed trades and the corresponding transaction
prices. Investors and dealers do not observe any of the variables chosen by nature, hence formulate
their orders and quotes, respectively, based on their beliefs about pf , pS, and l. We could then
also interpret ψ as controlling for the amount of uncertainty surrounding CB’s activity in the
25Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that its optimal intervention schedule is now given by XCBt =
γ
h
S −
³
E[f |It]
R − πX∗
´
+ λ2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢i
.
26In other terms, CB trades depend ex post on the “true” mean f selected by nature just with probability
v. The information set of the informed CB is then given by zIt =
©
zUt , f
ª
. Furthermore, we impose the logic
restriction that the uninformed CB cannot use its knowledge of S to infer f , i.e., that E
£
f |zUt
¤
is given.
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currency market in the eyes of other market participants. In fact, when ψ 6= 1
2
investors and
MMs can more easily infer what S is from their expectations about f .
Investors use their beliefs on f to formulate their optimal demand schedules Xi,t. As already
mentioned, we assume that both dealers and the monetary authority know perfectly investors’
beliefs E [f |It], hence their incoming orders Xi,t. This hypothesis, while simplifying the analy-
sis that follows, allows us to concentrate on the information asymmetry between dealers (and
investors) and the CB. Nonetheless, dealers’ beliefs about f are not irrelevant in the model.
Indeed, dealers also need to predict what the informed CB’s intervention is going to look like,
when and if it occurs. Hence they need to formulate some beliefs about f to be able to forecast
XCBt . Consistently with available (albeit scarce) empirical evidence (e.g., Fischer and Zurlinden
(1999)), in our setting all dealers observe sign and size of the most recent CB transaction, know
that this trade may be informative about f , and use this information to update their priors on it.
Vice versa, as in most currency markets, investors know if an intervention occurred, but do not
observe the transacted amounts. This lack of transparency slows down their process of learning
about f from the trade flow. We accommodate such a circumstance by assuming that investors
observe the most recent order Xi,t+1 arrived immediately after the intervention occurred (at time
t) and the price Si,t+1 at which it was transacted, that they infer from the sign of the observed
quote revision Si,t+1−Si,t−j which kind of intervention has taken place, and that they eventually
update their beliefs based on this filtered information, although with a delay. This form of order
flow uncertainty is between dealers and investors, and not among dealers, as in Evans and Lyons
(2000), and has not been previously explored by the currency microstructure literature.27
It is clear from an examination of the demand function of an informed CB that both the
sign and the magnitude of the intervention are going to depend crucially on the realizations of
f and S. For sake of simplicity, we assume that λ is small enough for wealth-preservation not to
be the dominating concern for the monetary authority, and that S and f control the direction
and size, respectively, of its optimal intervention, regardless of l. In particular, we consider the
case in which, for a low enough λ, the long-term value of the currency fH (fL) is such that the
expected NFV of investing in GBP-denominated bonds for the informed CB, (f − RSCBt ), is
positive (negative). This assumption de facto restricts that CB to four distinct interventions for
magnitude and direction. For high (low) values of both S and f , there is no trade-oﬀ between
policy and wealth-preservation motives in L
¡
S,λ
¢
, as they both push the monetary authority
to buy (sell) the foreign currency. The resulting intervention is then endogenously big in size,
BX
CB
t . For low (high) values of S and high (low) values of f , a trade-oﬀ between policy and
speculation motives instead exists, as the informed CB wants to chase the trend (lean against
the wind) while selling (buying) GBP is a negative NFV action. However, the low λ ensures
that the second eﬀect does not dominate the first, and that eventually the CB sells (buys) small
amounts of GBP, SXCBt .
28 Hence, when ψ is high (low), f is positively (negatively) correlated
with S, the trade-oﬀ in CB’s loss function L
¡
S,λ
¢
is more (less) significant, hence the informed
CB is more likely to intervene with a big (small) order.
What is the optimal intervention strategy of the uninformed CB? We focus on a specific
27One exception is the empirical study of Peiers (1997), who applies Granger causality tests to DEMUSD quotes
and shows that Bundesbank trades are revealed first to dealers and then to the general public.
28If, for example, S = SL and f = fH , the monetary authority leans against the wind (as SL <
fH
R − πX∗)
by selling GBP, i.e., XCBt < 0; however, at fH the NFV of investing in GBP-denominated bonds is positive, and
induces the CB to reduce the amount of GBP sold to dealers.
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pooling equilibrium in which the uninformed monetary authority, aware of the true S but not
of the true f , always buys (sells) foreign currency by the amount SXCBt > 0 (SX
CB
t < 0)
when S = SH (S = SL). This mimicking behavior is interesting to us because it prevents
observed interventions from being fully revealing of the information available to the CB about f ,
i.e., because it introduces uncertainty in the learning process of the dealers when they transact
with the CB. This uncertainty clearly depends on v, the parameter controlling the CB’s skills
at understanding fundamentals. More specifically, the optimal intervention schedules of the
informed (IXCBt ) and uninformed (
UXCBt ) CB are given by
IXCBt =

BX
CB
t > 0 if nature chooses
¡
SH , fH
¢
SX
CB
t > 0 if nature chooses
¡
SH , fL
¢
SX
CB
t < 0 if nature chooses
¡
SL, fH
¢
BX
CB
t < 0 if nature chooses
¡
SL, fL
¢
,
(28)
and, for the chosen E
£
f |zUt
¤
,
UXCBt =
½
SX
CB
t > 0 if nature chooses SH for any true f
SX
CB
t < 0 if nature chooses SL for any true f ,
(29)
respectively, when MMs use the following pricing schedule:
SCBt =

MSCBt ,
CSCBt
0
∞
for any order SXCBt , BX
CB
t
for any order XCBt < 0
¡
XCBt 6= SXCBt
¢
for any order XCBt > 0
¡
XCBt 6= SXCBt
¢
.
(30)
We report in the Appendix a set of restrictions on the dispersion of the model’s parameters
that, together with the exchange rates in Eq. (30) and the results of Proposition 2, ensure that
those CB actions are indeed optimal, in particular that the uninformed CB will pool with the
informed CB’s IXCBt not only in sign but also in magnitude, for any true f selected by nature.
Intuitively, the model’s parameters have to be such that policy motives are significant enough
to determine the direction of intervention for both the informed and the uninformed CB. The
extreme-pricing hypothesis of Eq. (30) guarantees that, if the uninformed CB decides to pool
with the informed one, the small positive order executed with the dealer(s) is equal to SXCBt > 0.
In fact, SCBt in Eq. (30) is “too low” or “too high” when the optimal
UXCBt is negative or positive,
respectively, given its prior E
£
f |zUt
¤
, therefore making mimicking optimal for the uninformed
CB at the true S. In this respect, we can then interpret the parameter v also as controlling for
the degree of informativeness of CB trading. If v = 1, any intervention can be attributed to the
informed CB, hence is fully revealing not only about S but also about f . Our dealers can in
fact infer from Eq. (14) and from the observed transaction sign and magnitude what nature’s
choice for f and S were, and revise their beliefs accordingly. If instead v = 0, CB trading is
never informative about f . Consequently, no updating of beliefs about f ever occurs.
4.2 Beliefs and beliefs’ revisions
Dealers choose potential prices and investors formulate their demand for the foreign currency
based on their beliefs about f , S, and l. In this subsection we describe how these beliefs are
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updated over time in our model. We first focus on the dealers. At each point in time t, before
setting their potential prices and before any new order arrives to the market, the MMs have some
priors about the true probability of nature having chosen fH (qf,t) and SH (qS,t) at t = 0, where
qf,t = Pr {f = fH |Mt} and
qS,t = Pr
©
S = SH |Mt, qf,t
ª
= qf,tψ + (1− qf,t) (1− ψ) , (31)
Therefore, the MMs’ expected values for f and S at time t are given by E [f |Mt] = qf,tfH +
(1− qf,t) fL and E
£
S|Mt
¤
= qS,tSH+
¡
1− qS,t
¢
SL, respectively. At the beginning of the trading
period [0, T ] the dealers have also priors about l (E [l|M0]). This prior may depend on their
past experience, or on the announcement of a future intervention by the monetary authority.
Hence, we can interpret the diﬀerence between E [l|M0] and the true l and the dispersion of
dealers’ beliefs around it (V ar [l|M0]) as measures of the credibility of CB’s announcements in
the currency market, and analyze the impact of diﬀerent degrees of such credibility on quotes
and spreads. If fMt (l) is the prior distribution of l given the information available to the MMs
at time t, before any new order arrives, then dealers’ prior about l is given by
ql,t = E [l|Mt] =
Z 1
0
lfMt (l) dl. (32)
We assume that those priors are updated according to Bayes’ Rule every time a new order
arrives to the market. The following proposition summarizes the way dealers’ beliefs ql,t, qf,t,
and qS,t evolve into the corresponding posteriors pl,t, pf,t, and pS,t in this stylized economy.
Proposition 6 The potential arrival of investors’ orders (a CB order) at t induces a downward
(upward) revision of the dealers’ prior ql,t into pl,t, where
pl,t =

E [l|Mt]− V ar[l|Mt]1−E[l|Mt] < E [l|Mt] if Xi,t arrives(
E [l|Mt] + V ar[l|Mt]E[l|Mt] > E [l|Mt] if SXCBt arrives
l if BXCBt arrives.
(33)
The posterior pl,t is used by the dealers for their reservation quotes at time t, and becomes their
best prior at time t + 1, i.e., ql,t+1 = pl,t. When an intervention occurs at time t, its sign is
always fully revealing of the CB’s target S. The arrival of a big positive (BXCBt > 0) or of a
big negative (BXCBt < 0) CB order induces full revelation to the dealers of the true f (hence of
the true l). If a small positive intervention (SXCBt > 0) occurs, then dealers update their beliefs
about f according to:
qf,t+1 = pf,t =
qf,t (1− v)
qf,t (1− v) + (1− qf,t) v , (34)
while if a small negative intervention (SXCBt < 0) occurs, we have
qf,t+1 = pf,t =
qf,tv
qf,tv + (1− qf,t) (1− v) . (35)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
That the sign ofXCBt is a suﬃcient statistic for the MMs to learn about S follows immediately
from our assumption that the NFV of currency trading
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
is always positive (negative)
for fH (fL). In addition, the arrival of BXCBt > 0 or BX
CB
t < 0 is fully revealing of f as well.
When instead SXCBt > 0 (SX
CB
t < 0) arrives, the possibility that it was submitted by an
uninformed CB induces just a partial revision of the dealers’ priors for f . More interestingly,
because of the potential informativeness of CB actions about f , not only the likelihood of an
intervention but the intervention itself, when and if it occurs, has an impact on MMs’ beliefs,
thus eventually on quotes and spreads. This eﬀect persists even when l drops to zero. A CB
trade, because potentially informative, induces a permanent revision of dealers’ expectations
about f , and such revision is embedded in their reservation prices, as we will see more clearly
in the remainder of this section. This is the information asymmetry channel of eﬀectiveness of
intervention.
Proposition 6 also states that the arrival of Xi,t (SXCBt ) reduces (increases) the perceived
likelihood of a future action by the monetary authority. The eﬀect of the potential arrival of an
investor or a CB onMMs’ beliefs is crucial in our model. Dealers set potential prices conditional to
the arrival of an investor of type 1, an investor of type 2, or the CB. The likelihood of such arrivals
((1− l) q, (1− l) (1− q), and l, respectively) is by assumption exogenous, i.e., independent from
those quotes. If an investor arrives, then the dealers are induced to believe that an intervention
is less likely, and the posterior about l, pl,t = E [l|Mt, Xi,t], is revised downward. If instead the
CB hits the dealers’ screens with a small order, the posterior about l, pl,t = E
£
l|Mt,SXCBt
¤
, is
revised upward. Therefore, the potential bid or ask prices already discount the knowledge of that
information, i.e., are computed based on pl,t and not ql,t. The same is true when the monetary
authority intervenes.
The entity of these updates depends on the degree of dispersion in the dealers’ priors about
l, V ar [l|Mt]. Widely dispersed beliefs around l, for a given E [l|Mt], induce a bigger impact of
order arrivals on beliefs’ revisions. As suggested above, we can interpret V ar [l|Mt] as a measure
of the degree of credibility enjoyed by a CB when it announces that it will intervene in the future.
When the monetary authority divulges information to the market about its future actions, MMs
form an opinion on l, E [l|Mt]. Even if E [l|Mt] = l, i.e., even if the dealers are able to predict
the true probability of intervention, the uncertainty in that estimate is going to aﬀect the size of
their beliefs’ updates (and quotes’ revisions) during trading. Thus, depending on their perceived
credibility, CB’s announcements have a potentially significant impact not only on price levels
but also on their variance. The arrival of BXCBt , by fully revealing f and S, induces a new
ql,t = l, for the magnitude of the intervention depends on its likelihood as well as on policy
and wealth-preservation motives. However, because of the assumed mimicking behavior by the
uninformed CB, observing the sign of a small CB trade does not reveal the true likelihood of
intervention. The dealers then use Eq. (33) to generate a new posterior for l. In both cases,
we assume that the resulting value for l (or pl,t) becomes dealers’ best prior for the likelihood of
the next incoming agent being a Central Bank, to reflect the fact that, following a government-
originated transaction, the likelihood of future interventions tends usually to decline, as reported,
for example, in Fischer and Zurlinden (1999).
How do investors change their beliefs about f when the CB intervenes? Dealers observe
first-hand XCBt , hence they can revise their expectations about f using Bayesian updating. We
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previously suggested that investors in our economy are only aware that an intervention actually
happened, if announced, but do not observe size and direction of that transaction. We also assume
that investors are unaware of past and current dealers’ beliefs about f , S, and l.29 However, we
assume that they do observe every past transaction price Si at which other investors in the
market might have traded GBP, and the corresponding amount Xi. Investors also know that the
CB might not be better informed than the rest of the market about f . Hence, they revise upward
(downward) their expectations about f if there is a positive (negative) drift in the most recent
transaction rate at the bid or at the oﬀer, Si,t+1, after the intervention occurred. Therefore,
transaction prices convey (albeit noisy) information to otherwise less informed agents in the
economy. If we define investors’ priors for pf as Iqf,t = Pr {f = fH |It}, the following proposition
applies.
Proposition 7 When an intervention occurs, investors observe the positive (negative) change in
the first transaction price Si,t+1 registered after the intervention (but not dealers’ new posteriors
and uninformed CB’s priors) and revise their beliefs at t+ 2 about f according to
Iqf,t+2 =
Ipf,t+1 =

Iqf,t[ψ+(1−ψ)v]
Iqf,t[ψ+(1−ψ)v]+(1− Iqf,t)[(1−ψ)(1−v)]
if ∆Si,t+1 > 0
Iqf,t[(1−ψ)(1−v)]
Iqf,t[(1−ψ)(1−v)]+(1− Iqf,t)[ψ+(1−ψ)v]
if ∆Si,t+1 < 0,
(36)
if the first transaction after the time t intervention happens at t+ 1; ∆Si,t+1 = Si,t+1 − Si,t−j is
the revision in the bid (i = 1) or ask (i = 2) price, and t− j is when the latest pre-intervention
transaction on the side i of the market occurred.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Investors use Bayes’ Rule to formulate a new expectation for f based on the observed quote
revision because they are assumed to be unaware of dealers’ past priors and posteriors for S, f ,
and l, and of the uninformed CB’s belief E
£
f |zUt
¤
. More specifically, in Proposition 7 investors
revise their beliefs about f simply using the information potentially conveyed by the sign of the
change in the transaction price, hence using a less refined update structure than the one our
dealers rely upon after observing the magnitude of the CB trade. Consequently, dealers and
investors may disagree on f even once such trade took place, i.e., it is possible that Ipf,t+1 6= pf,t.
Moreover, investors revise their beliefs just when a transaction occurred after the intervention
by the monetary authority. This delay induces positive serial correlation in transaction prices
immediately following the arrival of a CB order, an easily testable implication of our model.
5 A particular day in the currency market
Armed with these results, in the next two subsections we investigate how dealers with diﬀerent
degrees of market power revise their quotes when investors’ orders and CB interventions arrive to
29This assumption prevents our investors from being able to infer from observed past transaction prices and
quotes following CB’s intervention at time t, Si,t+j , what exactly the new dealers’ posterior for f , pf,t , is going
to be. Hence, we abstract in this paper from the issue of agents estimating other agents’ expectations from the
order flow, as explored in depth by Foster and Viswanathan (1996).
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our stylized forex market with information asymmetry, and examine the resulting behavior of the
expected transaction price S∗t during the interval [0, T ]. For both a monopolist and competitive
MMs, we specify the following sequence of events (stages) during the trading day:
0. At t = 0 MMs set potential bid and ask quotes based on their initial expectations for f , S,
and l. If the resulting expected likelihood of intervention is positive (ql,0 > 0), such quotes
are revised with respect to the benchmark scenario of Proposition 1;
1. Order flow from investors (Xi,t) starts arriving. When this occurs, MMs do not revise their
beliefs about f and S, because they know investors are not better informed than they
are about f . However, dealers revise their prior about l according to Proposition 6. This
revision induces a change in the quotes and spreads with respect to the levels of stage 0.
Following the resulting change in S∗t , investors do not revise E [f |It], because they know
that no CB intervention has yet occurred;
2. When the monetary authority eventually intervenes, both dealers and investors know the
CB has arrived. However, MMs transact directly with the government. Hence, they observe
sign and magnitude of its intervention, update their beliefs about S, f , and l (as described
in Section 4.2), and execute the order of the monetary authority at a price SCBt that
contains all the resulting revealed information. Such information is then discounted in
their reservation bid and ask quotes for any future incoming order. As our stylized forex
market is semi-strong eﬃcient, this process of beliefs’ and quotes’ revision occurs only if
the actual intervention was unexpected in its direction and size (S 6= E £S|Mt¤ and/or
f 6= E [f |Mt]), or if its arrival was unannounced (l 6= E [l|Mt]);
3. The first investors’ order coming to the market after the intervention is processed at the new
bid or ask price. After this trade occurs, investors observe the corresponding transaction
price change ∆Si,t+1 and revise their beliefs about f according to Proposition 7;
4. Incoming investors use their new expectation for f to formulate their demand for GBP.
Dealers use investors’ new E
£
f |It,∆Si,t+1
¤
to update their potential bid and ask quotes from
the levels of stage 3;
5. All future orders Xi,t do not induce any additional update of investors’ and dealers’ priors
about f (and S), but just of MMs’ priors for l, unless the CB credibly announces that it is
not going to intervene in the future. Hence, observed transaction prices may still change
from the immediately preceding round of trading.
Before the intervention actually occurs, the impact of ql,t > 0 on S∗t is due exclusively to
the imperfect substitutability of dollar versus GBP-denominated bonds for risk-averse investors.
The arrival of a CB order may instead reveal new information about f and S. At diﬀerent
stages, both dealers and investors update their priors based on such information. By the end of
the trading day, if the perceived likelihood of a future intervention by the monetary authority
drops to zero, any residual eﬀect on S∗t with respect to S
∗,l=0
0 should be due exclusively to the
signaling eﬀect of the past intervention. In the reminder of the paper we analyze the process
of intraday price formation implied by the above stages over the interval [0, T ] for a monopolist
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and competitive MMs and simulate the resulting equilibrium for a basic parametrization of the
economy.30
5.1 The monopolist dealer
In this subsection we derive, at each point in time tn ∈ [0, T ] across each stage of the sequence of
the sequence of events above described, explicit solutions for the problem of a monopolist dealer
(Eq. (15)) when his expectations E [f |Mtn ], E
£
S|Mtn
¤
, and E [l|Mtn] replace f , S, and l and the
investor’s optimal demand (Eq. (3)) depends on E [f |Itn] (instead of f). We start by assuming
that at time zero the monetary authority announces it will intervene in the future, but that, as
it often happens, the CB is vague about the objectives of its potential action.31 Based on this
information, and on his past experience, our dealer formulates a set of priors for l and f , ql,0 and
qf,0, and computes qS,0 using ψ (qS,0 = qf,0ψ + (1− qf,0) (1− ψ)). Investors formulate their own
beliefs about pf , Iqf,0, and those beliefs are assumed to be perfectly known to the dealer. As we
have done so far, we focus here on the sign and magnitude of the quote revision induced at each
of the stages with respect to the benchmark scenario of no intervention (l = 0) of Proposition 1.
At stage 0, before any order arrives, the dealer revises the potential bid and ask quotes with
respect to Sl=01,0 and S
l=0
2,0 ,
S1,0 = S
l=0
1,0 +∆
MS∗0 = S
∗,l=0
0 −
π (1− q)
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
+∆MS∗0 (37)
S2,0 = S
l=0
2,0 +∆
MS∗0 = S
∗,l=0
0 +
πq
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
+∆MS∗0 , (38)
respectively, where S∗,l=00 =
E[f |I0]
R
− πX∗ and ∆MS∗0 = πE [L|M0]E
£
XCB0 |M0
¤
is given by
∆MS∗0 =
πE [L|M0]E
£
S|M0
¤
2πE [L|M0] + λR −
1
2
n
S∗,l=00
o
+
λR
4πE [L|M0] + 2λR
½
E [f |M0]
R
¾
. (39)
What is the intuition behind this result? Because of Eq. (13), it is easy to show that
the informed CB’s optimal demand schedule at each point in time t is now given by XCBt =
γ
h
S −
³
E[f |It]
R
− πX∗
´
+ λ
2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢i
. The policy component of the intervention depends
on E [f |It] because so do both the investors’ order flow Xi,t and the expected transaction price
S∗,l=0t . Vice versa, the wealth-preservation motive is driven by the CB’s knowledge of f . As
we already emphasized in Section 3.1, the monopolist dealer, aware of the CB’s intervention
mechanism, uses both E [f |I0] and E [f |M0] to compute E
£
XCB0 |M0
¤
. Therefore, he increases
(decreases) his benchmark quotes if there is a positive probability (E [L|M0] > 0) that the CB will
buy (sell) GBP according to Eq. (39). Relaxing the full information assumption does not aﬀect
the absolute spread, because the MM, aware of whether his counterparty (when it arrives) is an
investor or the (potentially informed) CB, does not experience any adverse selection risk, hence is
30As in the full information framework, in both circumstances we impose similar sets of conditions to the
parameters on the model (and to agents’ beliefs) in order to interpret the wedge S2,t − S1,t as the diﬀerence
between the prices at which MMs are willing to sell and to buy GBP-denominated bonds.
31See the survey article by Sarno and Taylor (2001) for an analysis of the issue of secrecy usually permeating
government activity in currency markets.
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not compensated for it while providing liquidity to the market, as it is instead the case in Naranjo
and Nimalendran (2000). However, the proportional spread PS0 does decrease (increases) if
E
£
XCB0 |M0
¤
is positive (negative). Indeed, the MM can clear the market just by passing part of
the extra potential revenues (costs) resulting from a positive (negative) intervention. Therefore,
he revises PS0 downward (upward), i.e., in the opposite direction of the quotes.
In stage 1 the first investors’ order arrives, for example at time t1. The reservation bid and
ask prices at which the MM is willing to transact X1,t1 and X2,t1, S1,t1 and S2,t1 , respectively,
already account for his ensuing new belief that the CB is less likely to intervene in the future,
pl,t1 , where
pl,t1 = E [l|M0, Xi,t1 ] = E [l|M0]−
V ar [l|M0]
1− E [l|M0] < ql,t1 . (40)
The diﬀerence between the quote revision at stage 0 and the one at stage 1 depends on the
dispersion of the dealer’s beliefs about l, that is, on the credibility of the CBs’ announcement
about the future intervention. If this credibility is lower, i.e., if the dispersion V ar [l|M0] is
higher for a given ql,t1 = pl,0 = E [l|M0], E [L|M0,Xi,t1 ] is lower, the expected magnitude of the
CB order is higher (as we have seen in Section 2.4), and so is the resulting quote revision with
respect to the benchmark case, for ∂∆
MS∗0
∂L
< 0. Consequently, investors’ order flow induces more
volatility in the transaction price, via the process of belief updating for ql,tn , when the monetary
authority is less credible.
In stage 2, when the CB eventually intervenes (for example at time t2), the dealer discounts
his resulting new posteriors on S, f , and l into the price at which the transaction with the
government occurs,
SCBt2 =
1
R
©
E
£
ω1A|Mt1 ,XCBt2
¤
E
£
f |M0, XCBt2
¤ª
+
+E
£
ω1B|Mt1, XCBt2
¤ E [f |I0]
R
+ E
£
ω2|Mt1 ,XCBt2
¤
S + E
£
ω3|Mt1 , XCBt2
¤
πX∗, (41)
where E
£
ω1A|Mt1, XCBt2
¤
=
λR+πE[L|Mt1 ,XCBt2 ]
2πE[L|Mt1 ,XCBt2 ]+λR
> 0, E
£
ω1B|Mt1 , XCBt2
¤
= −E £ω3|Mt1, XCBt2 ¤ =
−πE[L|Mt1 ,X
CB
t2
]
λR
< 0, and E
£
ω2|Mt1 ,XCBt2
¤
=
2πE[L|Mt1 ,XCBt2 ](λR+πE[L|Mt1 ,XCBt2 ])
λR(2πE[L|Mt1 ,XCBt2 ]+λR)
> 0.32 As in
Proposition 3, SCBt2 is a weighted average of the MM’s and investors’ expectations about f , the
revealed target level S, and the risk-premium component πX∗. E [f |I0] has a negative weight in
Eq. (41) because if investors are more pessimistic about the domestic currency, ceteris paribus
the CB is expected to need a smaller positive XCBt to chase the trend, or a bigger negative X
CB
t
to lean against the wind. Vice versa, E [f |Mt2 ] has a positive weight in SCBt2 because if the NFV
of buying GBP is greater, the CB is then expected to execute a bigger positive XCBt , or a smaller
negative XCBt . In both cases, the dealer’s optimal response to clear the market would then be to
bid/oﬀer less for one unit of GBP. SCBt2 increases for higher E
£
f |M0, XCBt2
¤
because in that case
the speculative component of CB total demand for GBP is expected to be bigger. In transacting
32Therefore, the price at which the trade with the CB is settled is regret-free in the sense of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), as it eventually depends on XCBt2 . Because we assume that investors’ optimal demand schedules
Xi,tn are fully anticipated by the MMs, the prices at which their orders are cleared, Si,tn , are regret-free as well.
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with the monetary authority, the MM uses sign and magnitude of the intervention to update his
beliefs about f and/or S (if XCBt2 is unexpected) and his posterior pl,t2 = E
£
l|Mt1, XCBt2
¤
(if XCBt2
is unannounced) according to Proposition 6. In particular, pl,t2 becomes the MM’s best prior for
l for the next trading rounds.
At this point the investors simply know that an intervention happened, but did not observe
XCBt2 . Therefore, they cannot revise their beliefs about f until a new transaction with an investor
is executed. Indeed, the dealer embeds all his new information about f , S, and l, in his potential
prices for the next incoming investor of type i. When this investor arrives at stage 3 (for example
at time t3), that transaction is settled either at the new bid S1,t3 = S
l=0
1,0 +∆
MS∗t3 or at the new
ask price S2,t3 = S
l=0
2,0 +∆
MS∗t3 , where ∆
MS∗t3 is given by
∆MS∗t3 =
πE
£
L|Mt2 , Xi,t3
¤
S
2πE
£
L|Mt2 ,Xi,t3
¤
+ λR
− 1
2
n
S∗,l=00
o
+
λR
4πE
£
L|Mt2 ,Xi,t3
¤
+ 2λR
½
E [f |Mt2 ]
R
¾
.
(42)
The change in MS∗t3 with respect to S
∗,l=0
0 (∆
MS∗t3) is due to both the imperfect substitutabil-
ity (pl,t3 > 0) and the signaling (E [f |Mt2 ] 6= E [f |M0]) eﬀects of the intervention. In fact,
the MM used that transaction to learn about f and S, and then incorporated this new infor-
mation in his new potential bid and ask quotes. The investors are aware of this process, and
revise their beliefs about pf based on the sign of the diﬀerence between Si,t3 and the latest
price Si,t2−j registered before the CB actually intervened, along the lines of Proposition 7, i.e.,
E
£
f |I0, Si,t3 − Si,t2−j
¤
= Ipf,t3fH +
¡
1− Ipf,t3
¢
fL.
This new expectation enters type 1 and type 2 investors’ demand functions for domestic
and GBP-denominated bonds, and is discounted into the quotes set by the MM for the next
incoming order. Any future order flow, at time tn > t3, is then transacted at rates that reflect
not only the dealer’s and the investors’ new beliefs about f and S following the intervention
but also the update to the dealer’s prior about l, ql,tn induced by the next arrivals, so that
MS∗tn =
MS∗t3 + πE [L|Mtn]E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
= S∗,l=00 +∆
MS∗tn , where
∆MS∗tn =
πE [L|Mtn, Xi,tn ]S
2πE [L|Mtn , Xi,tn] + λR
+
1
2
½
E [f |It3 ]
R
− πX∗
¾
+
+
λR
4πE [L|Mtn ,Xi,tn ] + 2λR
½
E [f |Mt2 ]
R
¾
−
½
E [f |It0 ]
R
− πX∗
¾
(43)
andE [L|Mtn , Xi,tn] = E
£
L|Mt2 ,Xi,t3 , ...,Xi,tn
¤
. If the expected probability of future intervention
ql,tn drops to zero after an intense flow of investors’ orders, the reservation quotes Si,tn and
the expected transaction price MS∗tn revert toward the pre-intervention levels S
l=0
i,0 and S
∗,l=0
0 ,
respectively. The portfolio balance eﬀect on the exchange rate is in fact smaller on the incoming
risk-averse traders. However, the reversion is less than complete, as at the limit, for a tN ≤ T
such that ql,tN = 0,
MS∗tn converges to:
MS∗tN =
E [f |It3 ]
R
− πX∗ 6= S∗,l=00 . (44)
The long-lived diﬀerence between MS∗tN and S
∗,l=0
0 depends on the diﬀerence between E [f |It3 ]
and E [f |I0], and is due exclusively to the fact that CB intervention, potentially informative
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about f with probability v, induces a permanent revision in the investors’ beliefs. Indeed,
we can think of a typical cycle of CB actions starting with a public announcement such that
initially ql,0 > 0, continuing with a trade XCBt with the dealer(s), and ending with the market
at large not expecting any additional intervention in the short-term, i.e., ql,tN = 0. Announcing
a future intervention has an impact on quotes and spreads, but the sign and the magnitude
of such impact depend crucially on the dealers’ perceptions about the motives of the incoming
CB trades (E [f |M0] and E
£
S|M0
¤
), on the credibility of the announcement (V ar [l|M0]), and
on the investors’ elasticity of demand for the risky GBP-denominated bonds (π).. Because our
stylized forex market is semi-strong eﬃcient, the actual intervention is eﬀective as long as it is
unexpected and/or unannounced, i.e., just if it induces dealers and investors to revise their initial
beliefs. Eventually, unless the monetary authority keeps the threat of intervention alive, or unless
investors’ expectations about f have not been altered permanently by the previous intervention
(as in Eq. (44)), the exchange rate eventually reverts to the levels at which the currency was
traded at time zero.
To examine more carefully some of the implications of Eqs. (37) to (44) and to better
understand the dynamics of the resulting intraday process of price formation, we simulate the
sequence of events described in this section for a specific parametrization of the economy. We
assume that 30 trades arrive during the interval [0, T ], and that for simplicity the same time
elapses between each trade. We also assume (without loss of generality) that, consistently with
some anecdotal and empirical evidence (e.g., Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and Vitale
(2001)), the CB order arrives in the morning, at time t6. However, the dealer does not know
with certainty when and if that order will ultimately come. We choose the true likelihood of
intervention to be equal to 0.105, and then let the initial dealer’s prior about l, fM0 (l), be a
Beta (a, b) with a = 266 and b = 1215, implying ql,0 = aa+b = 0.18 (i.e., not centered on the
true l) and V ar [l|M0] = ab(a+b+1)(a+b)2 = 0.0001.33 As we did in Section 3, we select the initial
endowments X1 and X2 and the variable q so that type 1 and type 2 investors will be net sellers
and net buyers, respectively, for any tn ∈ [0, T ]. We finally impose a parameter ψ = 0.30 < 12 ,
hence that the true correlation between f and S is negative. A low ψ implies that the informed
CB is likely to try to fight the fundamental trend in the exchange rate behavior by setting low
(high) target levels for high (low) true f , as it is typically the case for G7 currencies (e.g., Sarno
and Taylor (2001)).
We start analyzing the case in which fL = $1.45 and SL = $1.31 and the informed CB
attempts to lean against the wind with a big negative order BXCBt6 < 0 in Figure 5a. The initial
benchmark exchange rate, calculated according to Proposition 1, is S∗,l=00 = $1.4345. We assume
that the CB announcement at stage 0 is successful in pushing down Sl=01,0 and S
l=0
2,0 because,
for ψ < 1
2
, the resulting E
£
XCBt1 |M0
¤
is small and negative, although investors are pessimistic
about the domestic currency (Iqf,0 = 0.75) and the probability that the CB may be uninformed
about f is positive ((1− v) = 0.2). Therefore, when it arrives, BXCBt6 is unexpectedly big. The
proportional spread PS0 increases, as the dealer needs to pass some of the expected cash outflows
from a future potential CB trade onto the population of investors in order to avoid to impose any
drift on his inventory while simultaneously making some profits from trading. Our CB is also
33We choose the Beta distribution for computational ease, as the posterior distribution computed using Bayes’
Rule is a Beta as well. The results that follow nonetheless hold for any other initial prior distribution for l with
support on [0, 1].
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not fully credible, for V ar [l|M0] > 0. Hence, the next few investors’ orders, from t1 to t5, lowers
the posterior likelihood of a future intervention to occur, inducing MS∗tn to slightly increase (and
the proportional spread to slightly decrease).
When the big and negative CB order arrives at t6, such intervention (as shown in Proposition
6) is fully revealing to the dealer of the true f and S. The MM embeds this knowledge in his
reservation quotes for the next incoming trades. Hence, MS∗t7 drops to around $1.3807. When
this occurs, investors observe the resulting negative ∆Si,t7 , hence infer that the CB was leaning
against the wind. Consequently, they become more optimistic about the domestic currency
(E [f |It7] < E [f |I0]) and incorporate this new posterior in their demand function. So does the
MM as well in pricing all future incoming orders. An additional downward (upward) adjustment
of the quotes S1,t8 and S2,t8 (the proportional spread PSt8) ensues, due to the signaling content
of the CB trade for the population of investors; its magnitude depends on π, or more precisely
on those investors’ demand elasticity, as illustrated by Eq. (44).
In stage 4 there are no more informative trades arriving to the market. Nonetheless, the
investors’ order flow from t9 to t30 drives down the dealer’s belief about l (ql,tn), according to
Proposition 6, and its conditional variance V ar [l|Mtn ] = E [l2|Mtn] − q2l,tn , and drives up the
absolute size of his expectation for a potential future intervention (E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
). Hence, the
threat of a future CB trade becomes less credible. Because the CB’s optimal demand schedule
is not a linear function of L, the eﬀect of the resulting greater magnitude of E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
(∂X
CB
t
∂l
< 0 in Section 2.4) on the market-clearing condition E [Ztn|Mtn] is more than outweighed
by the eﬀect of a lower and lower perceived likelihood of intervention. Consequently, the impact
of imperfect substitutability on the quotes is weaker and weaker, the expected transaction price
starts rising, and the proportional spread falls at an increasing rate. If we assume that eventually
both ql,tn and V ar [l|Mtn] drop to zero by time t30 = T , so does the portfolio balance eﬀect on
the reservation prices. Thus, the expected transaction price MS∗tn converges toward S
∗,l=0
0 , but
does not return to its pre-announcement level. Indeed, MS∗T = $1.3743 < S
∗,l=0
0 , i.e., closer than
it was at t = 0 to the target SL = $1.31. We also find that PST > PSl=00 . Both ∆
MS∗T < 0 and
∆PST > 0 stem from the signaling eﬀect of XCBt6 (E [f |IT ] < E [f |I0]): at time T investors are
more optimistic about the dollar than they were at stage 0, hence relatively more willing to sell
GBP; therefore, the monopolist MM reduces his bid and ask prices to clear the market, but not
the absolute spread, in order to maximize at the same time his expected revenues from trading.
What happens to quotes and spreads if the monetary authority intervenes with an unexpect-
edly small negative order, i.e., when both qf,0 and qS,0 are low but SX
CB
t6
< 0 occurs instead? For
the informed CB SXCBt6 < 0 is optimal when S = SL but f = fH , because of the ensuing trade-oﬀ
between policy and wealth-preserving motives. Because there is a positive probability that the
surprisingly small order came instead from an uninformed CB (i.e., that f could be equal to fL),
beliefs’ updates following its arrival are less than complete, along the lines of Proposition 6. In
particular, the new dealer’s posterior pf,t6 is greater than qf,0 but lower than 1. The resulting
price update ∆MS∗t7 of stage 3, albeit negative, may then be smaller than ∆
MS∗t5. Therefore, the
transaction prices at which orders Xi,t7 are settled, Si,t7 = S
l=0
i,0 +∆
MS∗t7 , may increase (and the
proportional spread may decrease) from the pre-intervention levels, even though the CB actually
sold GBP, i.e., even if S = SL. If at stage 4 the investors, unaware that SXCBt6 < 0, observe a
Si,t7 −Si,t7−j > 0, they revise upward their (already high) beliefs about pf , according to Proposi-
tion 7, the E
£
f |I0, Si,t7 − Si,t7−j
¤
that follows, higher (and not lower) than the original E [f |I0],
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is embedded in their demand schedules and in the dealer’s reservation rates. Thus, the expected
transaction price, MS∗t8 , rises again and converges to levels higher than S
∗,l=0
0 for E [l|MT ] −→ 0.
Thus, unexpectedly small interventions may generate undesired (or perverse) short- and long-
lived eﬀects on quotes and spreads. The existence of such perverse, i.e., not unidirectional
eﬀects of CB interventions on the target exchange rate has been documented in the empirical
literature. For example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993 a) report that purchases of dollars by the
Fed during the period following the Louvre Accord in 1987 were consistently accompanied by a
depreciation of the domestic currency in a market environment where investors were becoming
more pessimistic about the long-term perspectives of the U.S. currency. Additionally, in the
above scenario an unexpectedly small negative intervention may induce the proportional spread
to fall, and not to increase, as it was instead the case for the arrival of an unexpectedly big
negative order. These results suggest that not only the sign but also the magnitude of both the
intervention and market’s expectations about it play a crucial role in explaining its impact on
the process of price formation in a currency market dominated by a monopolist dealer.
5.2 The competitive dealers
We now consider the circumstance in which dealers do not hold any market power, hence are
unable to extract expected positive instantaneous rents from trading. We have shown in Sections
2.3 and 3.2 that, under the assumption of no inventory control, order processing costs, and full
information, no bid-ask spread arises in our stylized forex market when l = 0. The resulting
expected exchange rate S∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗ corresponds to the price that would emerge if all
risk-averse investors arrived at the same time in a competitive market. When instead l > 0, we
found that a wedge may be needed for the dealers to pass all additional revenues or costs from
a potential CB order onto the population of investors, while at the same time still clearing the
market.
In this subsection, we explore the impact of relaxing the full information assumption on
these results. More specifically, using the previously described sequence of intraday events, we
derive at each point in time tn ∈ [0, T ] explicit solutions for the problem of competitive MMs
(i.e., the equilibrium S1,tn and S2,tn such that E [Ztn |Mtn] = 0 and E [Πtn|Mtn ] = 0) when their
expectations E [f |Mtn ], E
£
S|Mtn
¤
, and E [l|Mtn] replace f , S, and l and the investors’ optimal
demand (Eq. (3)) depends on E [f |Itn] (instead of f). To do so, we further assume that the
price set by the MMs for any transaction with the CB is the price that in full information would
imply a zero spread, i.e., SCBtn = S
CB (∗) of Eq. (24). This hypothesis allows us to impose a zero
spread in the benchmark full information scenario with l > 0 of Proposition 4 by satisfying the
binding no-instantaneous profit condition under market clearing. At each stage of the trading
day (from 1 to 5), following a CB announcement at stage 0, the MMs update their beliefs about
f , S, and l (E [f |Mtn], E
£
S|Mtn
¤
, E [l|Mtn ], respectively), originally formulated at t = 0, in the
same way the monopolist MM does in Section 5.1, and consequently revise their potential prices
with respect to the benchmark case of Proposition 1 (l = 0), so that
S1,tn = S
l=0
1,0 + πE [L|Mtn ]E
£
XCB1 |Mtn
¤− n(1− q) π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− π
2
E [Γ|Mtn]
o
(45)
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and
S2,tn = S
l=0
2,0 + πE [L|Mtn]E
£
XCB1 |Mtn
¤
+
½
πq
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− πq
2 (1− q)E [Γ|Mtn]
¾
, (46)
where E [Γ|Mtn ] is obtained by replacing A, C, and XCBtn in Γ (Proposition 4) with their expec-
tations conditional on the information set M0, E [A|Mtn] = S∗,l=00 + πE [L|Mtn ]E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
,
E [C|Mtn ] = E [A|Mtn]
³
E[A|Mtn ]
πq
+X1 − RπE [f |Itn ]
´
− E [L|Mtn]E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
SCB (∗), and
E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
=
1
πE [L|Mtn]
½
E
£
S|Mtn
¤−µE [f |Itn ]
R
− πX∗
¶¾
+
+
λ
2 (πE [L|Mtn ])2
©
E [f |Mtn]−RSCB (∗)
ª
, (47)
respectively. Therefore, information asymmetry induces the following wedge between equilibrium
oﬀer and bid quotes:
S2,tn − S1,tn =
π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− π
2 (1− q)E [Γ|Mtn] . (48)
Such wedge is generally diﬀerent from zero, hence diﬀerent from the benchmark scenario of
Proposition 1 (l = 0) and from the full information scenario of Section 3.2 (l > 0 and SCBt =
SCB (∗)). It is also diﬀerent from the absolute spread quoted in the monopolistic scenario of the
previous subsection, π
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
. When E [l|Mtn] > 0, competitive MMs must dissipate all the
additional expected costs or revenues from expected CB trades onto the population of investors
while clearing the market. Because of imperfect substitutability, this can be accomplished only by
an asymmetric revision of reservation quotes, as in Proposition 4. The monopolist MM is instead
able to retain part of those expected revenues, or to pass part of those expected costs to the
risk-averse investors. When there is information asymmetry between dealers and the informed
CB (E [Γ|Mtn] 6= Γ), this eﬀect is enhanced by the uncertainty surrounding l (V ar [l|Mtn ]) and
sign and magnitude of the expected intervention (E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤ 6= XCBtn ) making more diﬃcult
for the competitive MMs to transfer the resulting expected cash flows to the risk-averse investors
while maintaining their inventory driftless. Such uncertainty does not aﬀect the spread set by
the monopolist MM, for he still finds optimal to adjust his quotes symmetrically (as in the full
information scenario) to maximize his expected profits from trading. Therefore, an equilibrium
nonzero wedge arises in Eq. (48), although we imposed that SCBtn = S
CB (∗), hence that the full
information competitive spread S2,tn − S1,tn = 0 (Eq. (23)).
To facilitate the intuition for those bid and oﬀer rates we simulate the case in which an
informed CB arrives to the market at time t6 with an unexpectedly big negative trade in the
attempt to lean against the wind, using the same model parametrization adopted in Figure 5a,
and display the resulting patterns for CS∗tn and PStn in Figure 5b. This experiment also allows
us to compare the impact of the same CB action on the intraday process of price formation in
our stylized forex market for diﬀerent degrees of market power. At the beginning of the day,
the announcement by the monetary authority induces a small downward revision in quotes, as
dealers expect the CB to sell a small amount of foreign currency, while both S2,0 − S1,0 and
PS0 decline (i.e., become negative, for Sl=01,0 = S
l=0
2,0 in Eq. (6)) as a result of E
£
XCB0 |M0
¤
< 0.
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Why is this occurring? To clear the market, competitive dealers need to attract more net buyers
and less net sellers. To do so, they mark down both their bid and oﬀer prices. Additionally,
because those dealers expect a cash outflow from the potential CB trade, they need to generate
positive expected net revenues from trading with the investors to satisfy the binding condition
that E [Π0|M0] = 0. For the given set of model’s parameters, this is achieved by reducing the
absolute and proportional spreads. When the MM holds significant market power instead (as in
the example of Figure 5a), the no-expected drift condition is the only constraint to his actions.
Therefore, he is still able to charge a positive spread and extract rents from the trading process.
Absolute and proportional spreads increase slightly toward the l = 0 levels for the next few
uninformative trades with investors, as ql,tn declines along the lines of Proposition 6, and so does
V ar [l|Mtn ]. When eventually the CB intervenes (at time t6) with a big negative order, sign and
magnitude of the trade are fully revealing of SL and fL. Quotes are consequently again revised
downward, but both the absolute and proportional spreads now increase, this time as in the
monopolistic scenario of Figure 5a, because at the new posteriors the MMs expect bigger future
negative orders XCBtn . The new spread at t7, in stage 3, is very close to zero by construction,
as now E
£
XCBt7 |Mt7
¤
= XCBt7 and S
CB
t7 = S
CB (∗), but not exactly so because E [f |It7 ] > fL.
Only afterwards (at t8) do investors learn from the observed transaction prices that a negative
intervention must have occurred, and become consequently more optimistic about the domestic
currency. Hence, they demand less GBP, thus inducing a smaller expected future intervention
and a consequent bigger increase of the proportional spread toward the initial levels when l = 0.
For the rest of the trading day, no more informative orders hit the dealers’ screens. Nonethe-
less, the MMs keep updating their priors about l according to Eq. (40). The arrival of Xi,tn
implies more uncertainty about whether the CB is going to arrive again, higher V ar [l|Mtn], and
a bigger expected absolute size of that potential future intervention. This uncertainty translates
not only in higher transaction prices but also in smaller absolute and proportional spreads. More
interestingly, the spreads decreases at an increasing rate, and at a faster pace than in the monopo-
listic case of the previous subsection. This implies, as evident from Figure 5b, that the time series
of observed (Si,tn) and expected (
CS∗tn) transaction prices are more volatile. What is the intuition
behind this result? At the beginning of the day, price volatility is high because the announcement
of a future intervention increased the dispersion of beliefs among market participants. Indeed,
the dealers, expecting a small negative CB order, revise downward their reservation quotes, al-
though investors forecast a weaker dollar (Iqf,0 = 0.75). When the intervention actually occurs
and the information learned from it is conveyed to all market participants, then new beliefs are
formed, the policy motives are fully revealed, and the exchange rate volatility subsides.
Lower ql,tn resulting from investors’ order flow and increasing uncertainty surrounding it make
more diﬃcult for the dealers to clear the market at each point in time, for the composition of
the incoming demand for GBP is becoming more diﬃcult to predict. Additionally, competitive
MMs still have to pass all expected extra cash flows from a potential future CB trade onto the
population of investors. Given the current demand elasticity and the fact that now investors,
being more optimistic about the dollar, are less willing to buy the GBP-denominated assets
that an incoming monetary authority would sell, bigger (but less likely) E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤
induces
absolute and proportional spreads to decrease, and transaction prices (and price volatility) to
increase. When ql,tn eventually converges to zero (by time T in Figure 5b), the conditional
variance V ar [l|Mtn] declines sharply as well. Hence, the threat of a future intervention becomes
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less significant and credible, and aﬀects less the process by which dealers formulate oﬀer and
bid quotes. Therefore, intraday transaction price volatility subsides, the absolute spread rises
toward the initial pre-announcement level, and so does PStn toward PST = 0 = PS
l=0
0 .
Nonetheless, even without portfolio balance eﬀects, eventually the expected transaction price
at T (assuming that ql,t30 = ql,T = 0) is equal to
MS∗T and is given by
CS∗T = $1.3743 < S
∗,l=0
0 .
More generally, it is easy to see that Eq. (44) applies to the competitive dealership case as well for
each possibleXCBtn . This result has two interesting normative implications for an active monetary
authority. First, the CB trade has the same long-lived eﬀect on quotes (but not on spreads) in
both the monopolist and competitive scenarios of Figures 5a and 5b, respectively, if the threat
of future intervention is not significant (E
£
XCBT |MT
¤
= 0) or not credible (ql,T = 0) by the
end of the interval [0, T ]. That eﬀect is due exclusively to the CB having signaled information
about f and S through its transactions (and to the investors’ updating mechanism for their
beliefs), consistently with the empirical findings of Pasquariello (2002). Portfolio balance eﬀects
of interventions on the exchange rate are instead short-lived. Indeed, if E [f |IT ] = E [f |I0] then
CS∗T = S
∗,l=0
0 unless ql,T > 0. In our model this is due to the structure of currency trading, i.e., to
the fact that trading occurs sequentially, and not to exogenous market integration increasing the
substitutability of domestic and foreign currency-denominated assets (as suggested, for example,
by Edison (1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001)). This observation has so far been ignored, to
our knowledge, by the financial and economic literature on exchange rates.
Second, with information asymmetry the intervention is more eﬀective (in both the short-
and long-term) than in the monopoly case as long as E [l|Mtn] > 0. In fact, for the same set
of parameters and initial priors, immediately following investors’ beliefs update in Figure 5b,
CS∗t8 = $1.3270 is lower than
MS∗t8 = $1.3506 (thus closer to SL = $1.31), and remains so as long
as ql,tn > 0 because the portfolio balance eﬀects of E
£
XCBtn |Mtn
¤ 6= 0 on Si,tn (i.e., the ensuing
quotes’ revisions ∆Si,tn) are more significant when the MMs are unable to extract rents from the
trading process, as we had already suggested in Section 3.3. However, if the perceived threat
of a future intervention becomes increasingly less credible (if ql,tn declines rapidly toward zero),
then S∗tn converges to
E[f |IT ]
R
− πX∗ of Eq. (44), regardless of the degree of market power held
by the dealers. The unsuccessful attempts by the (generally less credible) monetary authorities
of several Asian countries during 1997 and 1998 to lean against the wind and rescue their ailing
exchange rates seem to oﬀer some anecdotal support to these findings, for their domestic currency
markets were characterized by a smaller number of dealers holding more market power.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a theory of the impact of sterilized Central Bank intervention on
the microstructure of currency markets, and showed that this impact is indeed significant and
non-trivial. We analyzed the two major channels of eﬀectiveness of such intervention, imperfect
substitutability and signaling, in a model of sequential trading in which the stylized monetary
authority is a rational, but not necessarily profit-maximizing player. In the basic framework of our
model, domestic risk-averse traders do not reach the market simultaneously but according to an
exogenously specified arrival process with their demand for risky foreign currency-denominated
bonds. Prices are set by a monopolist, or by competitive risk-neutral dealers who maximize
expected instantaneous net revenues from trading under a market-clearing constraint. In such
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framework, the rational CB’s demand schedule results endogenously from the optimal resolution
of a potential trade-oﬀ between policy and wealth-preservation motives. This trade-oﬀ makes
interventions leaning against the wind more painful, or alternatively more expensive than if
chasing the trend.
When all agents are perfectly informed about the parameters of the economy and CB’s ob-
jectives, the market is strong-form eﬃcient. Full information restricts the eﬀectiveness of an
intervention to the portfolio balance scenario in which risk-averse investors have to be com-
pensated for having to hold more (or less) of the foreign currency than they otherwise would
were the CB trade unlikely. Under the more realistic assumption that investors and dealers are
not perfectly informed about fundamentals and CB’s policy motives, the market is semi-strong
eﬃcient and actions by the monetary authority may signal information to those less informed
agents. In both settings, we showed that the introduction of a CB has a significant impact on
the process of intraday price formation in our stylized currency market. Dealers’ reservation
quotes are revised upward (downward) as soon as the CB is expected to buy (sell) the foreign
currency with positive likelihood. The eﬀect of CB trades on absolute and proportional spreads
depends crucially on the degree of market power held by the market-makers. In the extreme
scenario of a monopolist dealer, the absolute spread is unchanged by the intervention. However,
the proportional spread increases (decreases) when the monetary authority is leaning against the
wind (chasing the trend). This occurs because the dealer is attempting to retain (pass) at least
some of the additional revenues (costs) resulting from the CB action in order to maximize his
expected profits, while at the same time keeping his expected inventory driftless. When there are
many dealers competing for the incoming trade, all potential cash inflows (outflows) resulting
from expected positive (negative) government orders have to be transferred onto the population
of investors. Because of imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign currency-denominated
assets, this can be achieved only by creating a wedge between bid and oﬀer prices.
This intuition is critical as well to understand why in our model a CB attempting to push
the exchange rate toward a target level is generally more successful when forex dealers hold less
market power. A significant degree of market power hampers such eﬀectiveness because the
market-makers, in their quest for profit-maximization, do not adjust their quotes completely in
response to the CB trade. When there is instead a multitude of dealers, costs and revenues from
those CB actions are transmitted fully to the risk-averse investors, hence the resulting quotes’
revisions are more substantial. We also demonstrated that interventions have a permanent ef-
fect on the exchange rate when the transacted CB order is informative, or when the threat of
future government actions is significant and credible. In particular, we showed that portfolio bal-
ance eﬀects are short-lived (consistently with available empirical evidence) because of sequential
trading, without having to invoke increasing financial integration and substitutability between
financial assets denominated in diﬀerent currencies.
In our model, changes in transaction prices, in bid and oﬀer quotes, and in the resulting
absolute and proportional spreads are found to be related not only to the sign but also to the
magnitude of the incoming CB order. Small CB trades are more easily accommodated by forex
dealers and more easily absorbed by risk-averse investors. Small orders are also not fully revealing
of the objectives and knowledge of an informed CB. Hence, they may induce less substantial or,
if unexpected, even undesired (or perverse) updates of marketwide beliefs, and eventually smaller
revisions in demands, transaction prices, and spreads. Furthermore, the speed of adjustment in
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those prices following a CB trade is shown to depend crucially on the degree of transparency
of the order flow in the market, i.e., on the process by which uninformed investors update their
beliefs over time. Finally, simulations of the intraday pattern of equilibrium transaction prices
in our setting revealed that exchange rate volatility tends to be high before an intervention
occurs, subsides when new information is conveyed to dealers and investors by the executed CB
order, then resumes following increasing uncertainty surrounding future actions by the monetary
authority, and eventually declines when a new intervention is perceived to be more unlikely.
This paper oﬀers many avenues for future research. Several are theoretical. For example,
our model focuses on the circumstance in which investors update their beliefs about the funda-
mental value of the currency just with a delay with respect to the intervention, because they
cannot observe the amount transacted. This delay, we argued, slows down the adjustment of the
exchange rate in the direction targeted by the monetary authority. However, we do not consider
the possibility that just one of the competing market-makers receives the CB order and that
the subsequent “hot potato” transmission of flows in the inter-dealer market, as in Lyons (1997)
and Evans and Lyons (2001), may aﬀect diﬀerently quotes and spreads. Allowing market-makers
to trade with each other during the day is a challenging yet desirable extension of our basic
framework, as Lyons (2001) reports that inter-dealer trading explains up to 75% of total daily
volumes in the global currency markets. Other avenues are more properly empirical. Our model
generates a rich set of implications of the positive likelihood of an incoming intervention and
of its arrival for intraday spreads, price revisions, exchange rate returns, and return volatility.
The recent availability of tick-by-tick transaction data for currency trades executed on behalf of
monetary authorities, e.g., the database of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), oﬀers an unparalleled
opportunity for financial economists to study in a comprehensive manner the process by which
dealers buy and sell foreign currency over a typical trading day.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the problem in Eq. (15), it is straightforward to show that
the equilibrium exchange rate quoted by the MM for a CB intervention is given by Eq. (18) with
ω1 =
λ2R2 − 2π2L2
λR (2πL+ λR)
, (A-1)
ω2 =
2πL (πL+ λR)
λR (2πL+ λR)
> 0, (A-2)
ω2 =
πL
λR
> 0. (A-3)
We assume that parameters in the model are such that SCBt is always positive. Plugging S
CB
t in
XCBt we have
XCBt = γ
·
S
µ
1− λRω2
2πL
¶
− f
R
µ
1 +
λRω1
2πL
− λR
2πL
¶
+ πX∗
µ
1− λRω3
2πL
¶¸
, (A-4)
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while plugging XCBt into Eqs. (16) and (17) gives
Si,t = S
l=0
i,t +
πL
2πL+ λR
µ
S − f
R
¶
+
π
2
X∗ =
= S
µ
πL
2πL+ λR
¶
+
f
R
µ
πL+ λR
2πL+ λR
¶
− π
2
X i. (A-5)
We finally use those prices and Eq. (3) to find the optimal orders for the investors,
Xi,t = P − 1
π
£
Sl=0i,t + πLX
CB
t
¤−X i. (A-6)
Eq. (A-6) implies that Xi,t = P − 1πSl=0i,t − X i − LXCBt , and X2,t − X1,t = X1−X22 . It is then
clear that, as in Saar (2000a), X1,t 6= X2,t, thus satisfying the dealer’s initial conjecture, unless
X1 = X2, i.e., unless we are in the economy where there would be no trading (and risk-sharing),
and no CB. In that economy there would be a population of investors of just one type (for
example, net buyers of foreign currency), and the market would open only when the MM expects
that XCBt < 0. Finally, we check that the CB’s initial conjecture that E [S
∗
t |zt] be equal to
qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t is indeed correct in equilibrium. In fact, from Eq. (A-5) it follows that:
qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t =
µ
f
R
− πX∗
¶
+
·µ
S − f
R
¶µ
πL
2πL+ λR
¶
+
π
2
X∗
¸
, (A-7)
while, after some tedious substitutions, Eq. (A-4) implies that
XCBt =
1
πL
·µ
S − f
R
¶µ
πL
2πL+ λR
¶
+
π
2
X∗
¸
. (A-8)
It is then clear that
¡
f
R
− πX∗¢+ πLXCBt = qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t, as originally conjectured by our
CB. Finally, it is easy to show that, for l > 0, the resulting investors’ optimal orders are MX2,t > 0
and MX1,t < 0 if X2 < 2
£
f
R
¡
πL
2π2L+λR
¢− S ¡ L
2πL+λR
¢¤
< X1, i.e., when X1 is “suﬃciently” high
and X2 is “suﬃciently” low.
Proof of Proposition 4. The construction of the equilibrium involves the same three
steps as in the proof of Proposition 3. However, in this case we use the market-clearing condition
E [Zt|Mt] = 0 to express S1,t as a function of S2,t and SCBt (Eq. (21)). Then, plugging the
optimal demand schedules of investors and CB in the no-profit condition E [Πt|Mt] = 0 generates
a quadratic equation with respect to S2,t, whose solutions are given by
S2,t =
f
R
− πX∗ + πLXCBt +
πq
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢± · πq
2 (1− q) (Γ)
¸
, (A-9)
where Γ =
½
(1− q)2
h¡
X2 −X1
¢− 2A
πq
i2
− 4
³
1−q
πq
´
C
¾ 1
2
> 0, A = S + λ
2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
, and
C = A
³
A
πq
+X1 − Rπ f
´
− LXCBt SCBt . We choose, and report in Eq. (22), the expression for
S2,t implied by the minus sign multiplying the squared term Γ, as it represents the only solution
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reverting to the case of Proposition 1 (Eq. (6)) when l = 0 and X1 > X2. Because of the
definition of Γ, we need to impose that the parameters of the model are such that
(1− q)2
·¡
X2 −X1
¢− 2A
πq
¸2
− 4
µ
1− q
πq
¶
C > 0. (A-10)
This condition is satisfied when
¯¯
X1 −X2
¯¯
is not “too” small. Finally, we verify that the dealers’
initial conjectures are confirmed under the selected set of equilibrium prices. It easily follows
from substituting Eqs. (21) and (22) into the investors’ optimal demand functions of Eq. (3)
that X1,t 6= X2,t if and only if
¡
X1 −X2
¢ 6= − 1
(1−q)Γ. For the set of parameters such that
the restriction of Eq. (A-10) applies,
¡
X1 −X2
¢
always diﬀers from − 1
(1−q)Γ when X1 > X2,
as in our model. This implies from the fact that, for X1 > X2, we have chosen the solution
implied by the minus sign in Eq. (A-9). If instead X1 < X2, then we would choose the solution
implied by the plus sign in order to have S1,t and S2,t reverting to the case of Proposition 1
when l = 0. In such a circumstance, it would then follow that X1,t 6= X2,t if and only if¡
X2 −X1
¢ 6= − 1
(1−q)Γ. But again this is always true, given the original assumption about the
types’ endowments (X1 < X2) and the fact that Γ > 0. Hence, as in the monopoly case, dealers’
initial conjecture about the investors’ types is verified in equilibrium. To save space, we do not
report here the last step of verifying that the CB’s initial conjecture that E [S∗t |zt] be equal to
qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t is indeed correct in equilibrium. Now, we can search for the price SCBt such
that S2,t−S1,t = 0. It is clear from Proposition 1 that this is the case if the CB is not intervening
(i.e., if l = 0 and/or XCBt = 0). Hence, when l > 0, it is possible to find the (extremely high or
extremely low) price at which our monetary authority (willing to chase the trend or lean against
the wind, respectively) does not find optimal to intervene, i.e., such that XCBt = 0. Because in
this study we focus on the impact of CB interventions on quotes and spreads, SCBt (∗) in the
text will instead always be the one price charged by competitive dealers to the CB such that
S2,t − S1,t = 0 but XCBt 6= 0. In order to find this price, we first observe that E [Zt|Mt] = 0
implies that qX1,t + (1− q)X2,t = −LXCBt . Hence, for E [Πt|Mt] = 0 to hold at a zero spread
andXCBt 6= 0, it has to be true that S1,t = S2,t = SCBt . Moreover, we have seen in Section 2.4 that
plugging the optimal investors’ demand for GBP-denominated bonds of Eq. (3) in E [Πt|Mt] = 0
gives
qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t = SCBt =
f
R
− πX∗ + πLXCBt SCBt . (A-11)
Lastly, we substitute XCBt in Eq. (A-11) with the optimal intervention schedule of Eq. (14),
solve for SCBt (∗), and find
SCBt (∗) = S1,t = S2,t =
µ
2πL
2πL+ λR
¶
S +
µ
λ
2πL+ λR
¶
f . (A-12)
It is easy to verify that, when SCBt = S
CB
t (∗), investors and CB’s conjectures are verified in
equilibrium, i.e., that X1,t 6= X2,t for X1 6= X2 (as then Γ = 0 and
¡
X1 −X2
¢
= − 1
(1−q)Γ for
X1 = X2 and SCBt = S
CB
t (∗)), and that E [S∗t |zt] is equal to qS1,t + (1− q)S2,t. If SCBt =
SCBt (∗), then CX2,t = 2MX2,t and CX1,t = 2MX1,t. Hence, to ensure that the resulting investors’
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optimal orders will be CX2,t > 0 and CX1,t < 0, the same restriction on the model’s parameters
reported in the proof of Proposition 3 applies. If instead SCBt 6= SCBt (∗), it can be shown that
CX2,t > 0 and CX1,t < 0 when the following restrictions on the model’s parameters (and the
chosen SCBt ) are satisfied:
X2 +
q
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢− q
2 (1− q) (Γ) <
·
P − 1
π
S − λ
2π2L
¡
f −RSCBt
¢¸
X1 − (1− q)
2
¡
X1 −X2
¢
+
1
2
(Γ) >
·
P − 1
π
S − λ
2π2L
¡
f −RSCBt
¢¸
,
i.e., again when X1 is “suﬃciently” high and X1 is “suﬃciently” low, as in Proposition 3. For
l = 0 these restrictions reduce to our original assumption that X1 > X2.
Proof of Proposition 5. The first statement of Proposition 5 ensues from the market-
clearing condition E [Zt|Mt] = 0 implying that S∗t = S + λ2πL
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
. If λ = 0 in L
¡
S,λ
¢
,
then CS∗t = S while
MS∗t =
1
2
S + 1
2
¡
f
R
− πX∗¢. Clearly MS∗t = S just when fR − πX∗ = S,
i.e., just when the intervention is actually not needed, hence does not occur. Finally, if we
substitute Eqs. (25) and (26) into Eq. (27), it is easy to see that EMt < 0 if and only
if
¡
f −RCSCBt
¢2
> 4π
2L2
λ2
£¡
f
R
− S¢ ¡ πL+λR
2πL+λR
¢− π
2
X∗
¤2
. For reasonable parametrizations of the
model, this will happen just for “very small” or “very high” values of CSCBt and/or for very high
values of λ. In those circumstances, wealth-preservation is “too” important for the CB, that
consequently resists the monopolist MM’s attempts to maximize profits at its expenses. Addi-
tionally, it is possible to show that if λ is “small” or if the NFV of investing in GBP-denominated
bonds
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
is positive when the CB is chasing the trend (but MSCBt >
CSCBt ) and nega-
tive when the CB is instead leaning against the wind (but MSCBt <
CSCBt ), Proposition 5 applies
to LM
¡
S,λ
¢
versus LC
¡
S,λ
¢
as well. In fact, their diﬀerence is given by EMt+λ
¡
WCT 0 −WMT 0
¢
.
Moreover, under those conditions CXCBt is always bigger than
MXCBt . It then follows that
λ
¡
WCT 0 −WMT 0
¢
, given by λ
£¡
f −RCSCBt
¢
CXCBt −
¡
f −RMSCBt
¢
MXCBt
¤
, is always positive,
and so is LM
¡
S,λ
¢−LC ¡S,λ¢. In other words, if λ is “small”, or if there is no trade-oﬀ between
wealth-preservation and policy motives in selecting the optimal XCBt , the CB is always better
oﬀ when dealers compete for the incoming trade. Instead, if such a trade-oﬀ exists and aﬀects
significantly the CB’s decision process, then LC
¡
S,λ
¢
> LM
¡
S,λ
¢
for some parametrizations of
the model, as in the case of EMt < 0.
Uncertainty about S, f , and λ: optimality constraints. As suggested in Section
4.1, the parameters of our model need to satisfy some rationality constraints to ensure that the
intervention choices of Eqs. (28) and (29) are indeed optimal for the informed and uninformed
CB. Let’s start with the informed CB. The following set of constraints (Participation Constraints,
PC) guarantees that its optimal intervention schedule is diﬀerent from zero, and that the signs
of Eq. (28) are optimal:µ
SH − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
fH −RSCBt
¢
> 0 PC-
¡
SH , fH
¢
µ
SL − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
fL −RSCBt
¢
< 0 PC-
¡
SL, fL
¢
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µ
SH − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
fL −RSCBt
¢
> 0 PC-
¡
SH , fL
¢
µ
SL − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
fH −RSCBt
¢
< 0, PC-
¡
SL, fH
¢
where E [f |It] is investors’ prior about f . If we assume that the NFV of buying GBP assets is
positive (negative) for fH (fL) and that λ is small enough, although not insignificant, for policy
(speculation) motives to prevail in determining XCBt ’s sign (magnitude), those constraints are
clearly satisfied for any set of parameters’ values such that SH is high enough and SL is low
enough with respect to S∗,l=0t : SL <<
E[f |It]
R
− πX∗ << SH . We also need to ensure that both
BX
CB
t > SX
CB
t > 0 and BX
CB
t < SX
CB
t < 0, i.e., that the optimal schedule of Eq. (28) is
compatible with the incentives implying from L
¡
S,λ
¢
. It can be shown, however, that this is
always the case for all possible sets of nature’s draws for f and S, given the above assumptions
about λ, S, and the sign of
¡
f −RSCBt
¢
. For example, it is clear that when the pair (fH , SH) is
true, the loss function resulting from Eq. (28), L
¡
SH ,λ, fH ,BX
CB
t > 0, S
CB
t
¡
BX
CB
t
¢¢
, is lower
than L
¡
SH ,λ, fH ,SX
CB
t > 0, S
CB
t
¡
SX
CB
t
¢¢
if the policy motive is suﬃciently important (e.g.
for small values of λ, or for an ambitious target SH) and fH is such that
¡
fH −RSCBt
¢
> 0.
Along the same line, if the pair ( fL, SH) is true, then L
¡
SH ,λ, fL,S X
CB
t > 0, S
CB
t
¡
SX
CB
t
¢¢
is
lower than L
¡
SH ,λ, fL,S X
CB
t < 0, S
CB
t
¡
SX
CB
t
¢¢
. Indeed, the gain ensuing from selling GBP,
weighted by the small λ, is by assumption not big enough to compensate the informed CB for
the loss stemming from a greater
£
S∗t − SH
¤2
. Now, we turn our attention to the uninformed
CB. We need to impose some restrictions on its beliefs about f such that it is always true that
UXCBt > 0 for SH and
UXCBt < 0 for SL. Hence, we need that, for the above conditions on S,
the following two PCs:µ
SH − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
E
£
f |zUt
¤−RSCBt ¢ > 0 PC-¡SH , E £f |zUt ¤¢
µ
SL − E [f |It]
R
¶
+ πX∗ +
λ
2πL
¡
E
£
f |zUt
¤−RSCBt ¢ < 0 PC-¡SL, E £f |zUt ¤¢
are satisfied. If fL ≤ E
£
f |zUt
¤ ≤ fH , then a small enough value for λ again ensures that, for each
true S, it is optimal for the uninformed CB to intervene in the direction postulated by Eq. (29).
Finally, it is easy to verify that the pricing schedule of Eq. (30) is suﬃcient to ensure that mim-
icking is better than intervening with the amount implied by L
¡
S,E
£
f |zUt
¤
, SCBt = 0 or ∞
¢
.
We have in fact assumed that λ is not small enough to make the wealth-preservation motive ir-
relevant in the monetary authority’s loss function. Thus, given the selected order sign UXCBt > 0
(UXCBt < 0) implying from SH (SL), any order diﬀerent from SX
CB
t > 0 (SX
CB
t < 0) is going
to be transacted at a very high (low) price, thus reducing (increasing) the NFV of investing in
GBP-denominated bonds with respect to the pooling scenario, and in both cases pushing the
corresponding loss function higher than if the uninformed CB had instead mimicked the informed
CB. In other words, given that wealth-preservation matters, the uninformed CB will always be
worse oﬀ paying an extremely big price to buy GBP or receiving an extremely low price when
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selling GBP if λ is not small enough to make the size of its future wealth irrelevant in the loss
function L
¡
S,E
£
f |zUt
¤¢
.
Proof of Proposition 6. As already mentioned in Section 4.1, under the assumption that¡
f −RSCBt
¢
is positive for fH and negative for fL, S controls the sign of the intervention, while
f (or E
£
f |zUt
¤
) explains its magnitude. Hence, the sign of the CB order is always fully revealing
to the dealers of the true S. It is also clear from Eqs. (28) and (29) that the arrival of big positive
and negative interventions induces a full revelation of the true CB type to the MMs, as there is in
fact one and one type only of informed CB that would optimally trade each of those order signs
and sizes. When instead a small positive (negative) order is observed, the possibility that it is
an uninformed CB to submit it induces just a partial revision of the dealers’ prior probabilities
for f and S. We assumed in Section 4.1 that the CB is informed about f with probability v, and
about S with probability 1. By Bayes’ Rule, it follows that, for ξH = Pr
¡
XCBt |fH , S
¢
, we have:
pf,t =
qf,tξH
qf,tξH + (1− qf,t) ξL
. (A-13)
Using Eqs. (28) and (29), and the fact that the sign of XCBt is revealing of the true S to
the dealers, we can calculate the conditional probability of arrival of each of the four possible
orders. For example, if SXCBt > 0 arrives, and consequently SH is revealed to the MMs, then
ξH = Pr
¡
XCBt |fH , SH
¢
= (1− v) because just the uninformed CB would intervene with that
magnitude for the pair (fH , SH). Thus, we have that ξH = 1 and ξL = 0 if BX
CB
t > 0 arrives (and
S = SH), ξH = (1− v) and ξL = v if SXCBt > 0 arrives (and S = SH), ξH = v and ξL = (1− v)
if SXCBt < 0 arrives (and S = SL), and that ξH = 0 and ξL = 1 if BX
CB
t < 0 arrives (and
S = SL). It then follows that, when S = SH , pf,t = 1 if XCBt = BX
CB
t > 0, but that pf,t is
given by Eq. (34) if XCBt = SX
CB
t > 0. However, when S = SL, pf,t = 0 if X
CB
t = BX
CB
t < 0,
but that pf,t is given by Eq. (35) if XCBt = SX
CB
t < 0. Finally, we derive dealers’ beliefs about
l. Small XCBt are not fully revealing about f because of mimicking behavior by the uninformed
CB (v < 1), hence we assume MMs use Bayes’ Rule to revise their beliefs about l. When instead
a big intervention occurs, the dealers know what the true S and f are. Thus, they use that
information to learn what l is (and their posterior becomes pl,t = l) from the observed order
sign, as BXCBt is function of l as well. The new prior ql,t+1 = pl,t is still subject to change due to
the incoming order flow, because V ar [l|Mt], a proxy for CB credibility, is still positive. When
an investors’ order (Xi,t) or a small CB order (SXCBt ) arrives, from Bayes’ Rule the resulting
conditional posterior distribution of l is given by
fMt,Xi,t (l) =
(1− l) fMt (l)R 1
0
(1− l) fMt (l) dl
(A-14)
or by
fMt,SXCBt (l) =
lfMt (l)R 1
0
lfMt (l) dl
, (A-15)
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respectively. As in Saar (2000a), it is then easy to show that, if Xi,t arrives,
pl,t =
Z 1
0
lfMt,Xi,t (l) dl =
R 1
0
l (1− l) fMt (l) dlR 1
0
(1− l) fMt (l) dl
=
=
E [l|Mt]− E [l2|Mt]
1−E [l|Mt] = E [l|Mt]−
V ar [l|Mt]
1− E [l|Mt] , (A-16)
while, if SXCBt arrives,
pl,t =
Z 1
0
lfMt,SXCBt (l) dl =
R 1
0
l2fMt (l) dlR 1
0
lfMt (l) dl
=
=
E [l2|Mt]
E [l|Mt] = E [l|Mt] +
V ar [l|Mt]
E [l|Mt] . (A-17)
Proof of Proposition 7. Investors update their beliefs about pf when they observe the
sign of ∆Si,t+1 following the CB intervention. Investors are by assumption unaware of any of
dealers’ past priors and new posteriors for S, f , or l, hence cannot extrapolate any of them
from the last transaction price. However, they know that CBs are uninformed with probability
1−v, that interventions produce an impact on quotes just if unexpected (after controlling for the
impact of XCBt and Xi,t on ql,t), and that, if an intervention hits the dealers’ screens, the resulting
transaction is big with probability ψ. Because the CB, when informed, acts according to Eq. (28),
and because, if uninformed, the CB instead mimics the moves of the informedmonetary authority,
it then follows that Pr {∆Si,t+1 > 0|fH} = ψ + (1− ψ) v, Pr {∆Si,t+1 < 0|fH} = (1− ψ) (1− v),
Pr {∆Si,t+1 > 0|fL} = (1− ψ) (1− v), and Pr {∆Si,t+1 < 0|fL} = ψ + (1− ψ) v. For example,
given that an intervention actually occurred, a ∆Si,t+1 > 0 can arise from an unexpectedly big
positive CB order (revealing S to the dealers and inducing them to revise upward their beliefs
about f) with probability ψ, or from an unexpectedly small negative order (inducing the dealers
to revise upward a previously small prior about f) with probability 1 − ψ. In the first case,
BX
CB
t > 0 may originate just from an informed CB aware of f = fH . In the second case,
SX
CB
t < 0 may be the result of the actions of a CB informed about fH just with probability
v, as an uninformed CB finds optimal to intervene with a small negative order even if f = fL.
Finally, for simplicity, we impose that V ar [l|Mt] is small enough so that, following the arrival
of the uninformative order Xi,t+1 and along the lines of Eq. (33), ql,t+2 does not decline “too
much,” i.e., |ql,t+2 − ql,t+1| is not “too big,” and investors do not need to control for the part
of the quote’s revision that is due to dealers’ new beliefs about l, when they update their prior
Iqf,0. Indeed, this assumption allows us to avoid the scenario in which CB’s credibility is so low
(i.e., |ql,t+2 − ql,t+1| is so big) to more than compensate the eﬀect of the dealers’ new posteriors
pf,t, pl,t, and pS,t on the transaction price change ∆Si,t+1, hence so big to induce our investors
to false inference on f . Consequently, by Bayes’ Rule, if for example ∆Si,t+1 > 0 is observed, we
have that
Ipf,t+1 =
Iqf,t Pr {∆Si,t+1 > 0|fH}
Iqf,t Pr {∆Si,t+1 > 0|fH}+ (1−I qf,t) Pr {∆Si,t+1 > 0|fL} . (A-18)
The expression for Ipf,t+1 when ∆Si,t+1 < 0 is similarly obtained. Eq. (36) then follows.
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Figure 1. Intervention with a monopolist dealer and full information
Comparative statics: monopolist dealer, full information, and CB chasing the trend. Exchange rate St on
right axis, ∆Si,t on left axis. Model parametrization: α = 1, R = 1.05, σ
2
F = 0.0045, X1 = 15, X2 = 5,
q = 0.5, f = 1.7, S = 1.58, λ = 0.00001. The resulting S∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗ = 1.5761.
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Figure 2. Intervention with competitive dealers and full information
Comparative statics: competitive dealers, and full information. Units of foreign currency on right axis, spread
on left axis. Model parametrization: α = 1, R = 1.05, σ2F = 0.025,X1 = 15, X2 = 5, q = 0.5, f = 1.7,
Sa = 1.45, Sb = 1.35, λ = 0.00001, S
CB
t = S. The resulting S
∗,l=0
t =
f
R
− πX∗ = 1.3810.
a) CB chasing the trend b) CB leaning against the wind
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
3% 6% 9% 12%
15%
18%
21%
24%
27%
30%
33%
36%
39%
42%
45%
48%
Likelihood of CB Intervention
Sp
re
ad
-7.00
0.00
7.00
14.00
21.00
28.00
C
B
 O
rd
er
 (s
ig
ne
d)
Bid-Ask Spread
Xcb
-0.0010
-0.0009
-0.0008
-0.0007
-0.0006
-0.0005
-0.0004
-0.0003
-0.0002
-0.0001
0.0000
3% 6% 9% 12%
15%
18%
21%
24%
27%
30%
33%
36%
39%
42%
45%
48%
Likelihood of CB Intervention
Sp
re
ad
-40.00
-34.00
-28.00
-22.00
-16.00
-10.00
-4.00
2.00
8.00
C
B
 O
rd
er
 (s
ig
ne
d)
Bid-Ask Spread
Xcb
51
Figure 3. Intervention with competitive dealers and full information: sensitivity analysis
Comparative statics: competitive dealers, full information, and CB chasing the trend. (a) Dollar revenues
on right axis, spread on left axis. (b) Units of foreign currency on right axis, spread on left axis. Model
parametrization: α = 1, R = 1.05, σ2F = 0.025, X1 = 15, X2 = 5, q = 0.5, f = 1.7, Sa = 1.45,λ =
0.00001, l = 0.03. The resulting S∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗ = 1.3810.
a) Spread versus X1
X2
b) Spread and XCBt versus S
CB
t
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Figure 4. Eﬀectiveness of intervention with full information
Comparative statics: full information, and CB chasing the trend. Exchange rate St on right axis, GBP
amounts on left axis. Model parametrization: α = 1, R = 1.05, σ2F = 0.025, X1 = 15, X2 = 5, q = 0.5,
f = 1.7, S = 1.45, λ = 0.00001. The resulting S∗,l=0t =
f
R
− πX∗ = 1.3810.
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Figure 5. Intervention with information asymmetry
Monopolist currency dealer (a) and competitive currency dealers (b): CB leaning against the wind with
BX
CB
t6
< 0. Expected exchange rate S∗t on left axis (dark continuous line), transaction prices Si,t on left axis
(light continuous line), proportional spread PStn on right axis (dotted line). Model parametrization: α = 1,
R = 1.05, σ2F = 0.015, X1 = 12, X2 = 1, q = 0.25, fH = 1.6, fL = 1.45, SH = 1.5, SL = 1.31,
λ = 0.001. Market’s beliefs: Iqf,0 = 0.75,
Uqf,0 = 0.5, qf,0 = 0.75, v = 0.8, ψ = 0.3, qS,0 =
qf,0ψ + (1− qf,0) (1− ψ) = 0.40, E
£
S|M0
¤
= 1.3860. The star symbol on the x-axis indicates when the
intervention occurs in the simulated sequence of events.
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